Property rights and hospital behavior under DRGs : an examination of nonprofit, government, and forprofit sectors by Andal Sorrentino, Elizabeth M.
Florida International University
FIU Digital Commons
FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations University Graduate School
12-1987
Property rights and hospital behavior under DRGs
: an examination of nonprofit, government, and
forprofit sectors
Elizabeth M. Andal Sorrentino
Florida International University
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd
This work is brought to you for free and open access by the University Graduate School at FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact dcc@fiu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Andal Sorrentino, Elizabeth M., "Property rights and hospital behavior under DRGs : an examination of nonprofit, government, and
forprofit sectors" (1987). FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations. Paper 2157.
http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/2157
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND HOSPITAL BEHAVIOR UNDER DRGS 
AH EKAHINATIOH OF NONPROFIT, 
GOVERHHEHT, AND FORPROFIT SECTORS 
BV 
ELIZABETH M. ANDAL SORRENTINO, R. N. 
DISSERTATION 
Submitt•d in partial fulfillm•nt of th• r•quir•m•nt• for 
th• d•gr•• of Doctor of Philoaophy in 
Public Adminiatraticn at th• 
Schaal of Public Affair• and B•rvic•• 
Florida Int•rnational Univer•ity 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND HOSPITAL BEHAVIOR UNDER DRGS 
AH EXAHIHATIOH OF HOHPROFIT, 
GOVERHHENT, AHD FORPROFIT SECTORS 
BY 
ELIZABETH M. ANDAL SORRENTINO, R. N. 
DISSERTATION 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the r•quir•m•nt• fer 
the degr•e of Doctor of Philosophy in 
Public Administration at the 
School of Public Affair• and S•rvic•• 
Florida International University 
December 1987 
Approved• 
~--.....,._ _________ _ 
Copyright 1987 
ELIZABETH M. ANDAL SORRENTINO, R. N. 
iii 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND HOSPITAL BEHAVIOR UNDER DRBS 
AH EXAHlNATlOH OF HDHPROFlT, 
GOVERHHEHT, AND FDRPROFlT SECTORS 
BY 
ELIZABETH M. ANDAL SORRENTINO, R. N. 
ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
Submitt•d in partial fulfillment of th• r~uir...nt• for 
th• d•gr•• af Dactar af Philaaophy in 
Public Administration at th• 
Scheel af Public Affairs and Sarvic .. 
Florida International University 
iv 
This study compares nonprofit, government, and 
forprofit hospitals in South Florida. Property rights 
arrangement is defined as rights to re~idual profits in 
the forprafit hospitals, and the tax-exemption status 
on the part of nonprofit and government hospitals with 
obligations to serve charitable purposes in the public 
interest. This dissertation derives and tests 
implications about differences in behavior in the 
context of efficiency, equity, and quality of care 
delivered in nonprofit, government, and forprofit 
hospitals. 
Fifty-six hospitals with Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Hospitals <JCAH> accreditation were 
compared on institutional variables (bed size, 
location>; efficiency variables (occupancy rates, 
ancillary expenses, bad debts, manhours per patient day, 
salaries per FTE, length of stay/DRG, charges/DRG, 
reimbursement/ORB (on twenty DRGs>; equity variables 
<Medicare days, Medicaid days, and uncompensated care>; 
and finally, the quality variable <death rates/DRS on 
twenty DRGs). 
The immediate effects of profit maximization is 
considered as an incentive for managers in the forprofit 
hospitals. The social obligations attached to the tax-
exemption status can be argued as the underlying 
rationale far output maximization, i. e. maximizing 
v 
benefits to society by serving more patients in the 
nonprofit and government hospitals. 
Using analysis of variance, nonprofit, government, 
and forprofit hospitals were compared to determine if 
statistically significant differences were present at 
the .05 level of significance. Pairs of hospital types 
were tested for significant differences using ANOVA, 
Mann-Whitney, and multiple regression analysis. 
The results provided mixed support for the property 
rights theory. Significant differences were found on 
institutional variables, bed size and location; 
efficiency variables, bad debts, manhours per patient 
day, and charges per DRG; equity variables Medicare 
days, Medicaid days, and uncompensated care. In terms 
of the quality variable, the death rates per DRG showed 
no statistical significance. 
Unexpectedly, nonprofit hospitals were very similar 
to forprofit hospitals on the variables bad debts and 
Medicaid days. The relevance of this finding to health 
policy issues today, particularly tax-exemption 
privileges, warrant a suggestion for further evaluation 
of the performance of the nonprofit sector. 
vi 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Property rights arrangement, hospital ownership 
<nonpro~it, government, and forprofit>, and possible 
di~ferences in behavior are factors to be explored as 
the focus in the health care environment shifts to 
effectiveness and cost containment. This study examines 
the behavior of nonprofit, government and ~orprofit 
hospitals in the context of efficiency, equity, and 
quality of services delivered. 
Property rights theory posits that rights to 
residual profits, as a reward for administrative 
effectiveness in the forprofit hospital, provides one 
underlying rationale for the dif~erences in hospital 
behavior. Several hypotheses will be advanced regarding 
the behavior of the nonprofit, government, and forprofit 
hospitals. Forprofit hospitals are thought of as having 
economic incentives to be efficient as compared to the 
nonprofit and government counterpart. By virtue of 
their focus on profits, provision of care to patients in 
1 
the hospital setting may be less equitable (as measured 
in terms o~ number of Medicare/Medicaid days and amount 
of uncompensated care). The quality of care provided is 
a function of the standards established by the state 
licensing and accreditation bodies. It is reasonable to 
think along the line that hospitals, regardless of 
ownership status, will attempt to meet minimum 
standards. The nonprofit and government hospital may 
expand their units of service <output maximization> to 
society at a level of quality that is within budget 
constraints. The farprofit hospitals will attempt to 
maintain a level of quality that ensures patients will 
patronize it and that it will attain accreditation. 
The underlying premise for the output maximization 
rationale for the nonprofit and government hospital is 
that these hospitals do not have rights to residual 
profits but do have special tax-exemption status. As 
such, these hospitals are expected to serve charitable 
purposes in the public interest. This suggests that 
hospitals organized as nonprofit (or government-owned> 
will attempt to maximize benefits to society by 
expanding units of service. 
Today, there is emphasis on cost containment in the 
provision of health care. Hospitals are faced 
with providing inpatient care according to the price 
limits set under the Diagnosis Related Groupings <DRGs> 
2 
for all Medicare patients. The retrospective 
reimbursement system which encouraged the 
overutilization of many health services is now passe. 
Published work along the lines of property rights have 
not examined the implications to the provision of health 
care in the context of efficiency, equity, and quality. 
Over the years, studies have been done to explain 
differences in hospital behavior using economic models. 
With the exception of Clarkson's work (1972>, theory-
based explanation of differences is lacking. 
There are five subsequent chapters which c•n be 
briefly described as follows: 
Chapter II Literature RevieN is in three parts. 
The first part discusses some background information 
regarding the heavily regulated environment hospitals 
are in. The second part presents property rights 
research and economic models which explain some of the 
differences in behavior of the nonprofit and forprofit 
hospitals, thus providing groundwork for subsequent 
relationships that are examined further in the text. In 
the third part, literature is presented on studies 
comparing the performance of the three hospital 
ownership types and provides justification for the 
relevant variables pertinent to this dissertation. 
Chapter III Fra•eNork for Analysis. The property 
rights theory is used as the rationale for why 
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differences in hospital behavior according to ownership 
status might be expected. This chapter discusses the 
variables to be analyzed in the study. It explains some 
expectations regarding the behavior of nonprofit 9 
forprofit, and government hospitals in the context 
of efficiency, equity, and quality. 
are identified for testing. 
Specific hypotheses 
Chapter IV Hethodology This chapter describes the 
study papulation 9 data management, and statistical 
methods used for analysis. The unit of analysis is the 
hospital and the study setting is South Florida. This 
section gives information regarding the data used to 
allow insight on validity and generalizability concerns. 
Chapter V Results This chapter presents the 
results of hypotheses-testing for institutional, 
efficiency, equity, and quality variables. 
summarized and conclusions presented. 
Each area i~ 
Chapter VI Conclusion This chapt~r shows a 
summary of the variables and pertinent findings 
regarding the behavior a~ the nonprofit, government, and 
forprofit hospitals. The generalizability of the 
finding~ is discussed in the light of the study 
limitations. Recommendations for future research are 
cited. The utility of the study findings from a 
practical and theoretical standpoint are discussed. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
This review of literature is divided into three 
parts. First is the area of health care policy which 
briefly describes the trends which led to the present 
changes in the health care delivery system. This will 
give an overview of the environment wherein hospitals 
operate and allude to the institutional variables which 
will be examined later (geographic location, size, and 
service type of hospitals). The second part focuses on 
the property rights research and economic models 
relating to differences in behavior of hospitals. Third 
and last, studies comparing nonprofit, government, and 
forprofit hospitals are cited and provides justification 
for relevant variables in the subsequent analysis. 
H•altn Car• Palicy 
From the standpoint of public policy, strategies to 
assure quality of care include regulatory measures which 
affect hospitals and licensed practicing pro+essionals 
in the health care setting. The Hill-Burton Act of 1946 
was aimed at increasing the availability and 
5 
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accessibility of facilities. The Social Security 
Amendments (Title VI of 1965> created the Medicare and 
Medicaid programs <Title XIX) to provide for the health 
care needs of the elderly and the indigent. Title XIX 
established a medical assistance program for all those 
regardless of age who qualified for public assistance 
and far those whose medical expenses threatened to 
produce future indigency <Marmor, 1982>. The 
Comprehensive Health Manpower Training Act and the 
Health Professions Educational Assistance Act of 1971 
were attempts to increase the availability and 
accessibility of manpower. 
In 1972, the United States Congress attempted to 
11 improve quality" through the establishment of peer 
review programs. The Social Security Amendment of 1972 
(P. L. 92-603> created the PSROs <Professional Standards 
Review Organizations). The PSROs monitor the 
appropriateness of utilization and the quality of 
institutional services provided to beneficiaries of 
Medicare and Medicaid programs. The explicit objectives 
of this legislation included the review of services 
provided to all federal beneficiaries, to evaluate the 
necessity for institutional admission, the duration of 
institutional service, appropriateness of the level of 
institutional care, and the adequacy and relevance 
<quality> of services provided. 
Although the Joint Commission on Accreditation of 
Hospitals <JCAH) was founded in the early 1950sy it was 
not until the birth of the PSROs that emphasis on the 
appraisal of health services quality would be given 
greater attention. In 1979, JCAH published its 
standards on quality assurance which focused on 
professional and organizational relationships. While 
PSRDs involve peer review activities resting on the 
physicians, JCAH implies dual responsibility by 
administrators and physicians. Accountable to both 
institutions and physicians are also members of the 
nursing profession. State licensure rules and 
regulations govern practice of these professionals. 
The Nurse Practice Act <Florida Statute Section 464.003, 
1979> defines what nurses are allowed to do and 
specifies its scope. Licensure renewals and 
disciplinary actions are subject to these mandates. 
Compliance with JCAH standards is needed by the 
hospital to achieve accreditation. The government 
requires that a hospital caring for patients on Medicare 
and Medicaid be accredited to be eligible for 
reimbursement. The standards for accreditation by the 
JCAH include the following (JCAH, 1987>: 
(1) the hospital maintains facilities, beds, and 
services that are available over a continuous 24-hour 
period, seven days a week. 
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<2> the hospital has a median length of stay of 30 
days or less <This differentiates hospitals from nursing 
homes or chronic care facilities.). 
(3) the hospital provides for the following 
services: 
anaesthesia 
diagnostic radiology 
dietetic services 
emergency services 
infection control 
medical records 
medical staff 
nursing services 
nuclear medicine services 
pathology and medical laboratory services 
pharmaceutical services 
plant, technology, and safety management services 
professional library services 
quality assurance program 
respiratory care services 
special care services 
utilization review 
These are minimum eligibility requirements for 
accreditation for hospitals regardless of ownership 
status. 
There is a common impression that forprofit 
hospitals identify potential profitable markets and 
build or acquire hospitals in specific geographic areas. 
While this may be partly true, there are some 
regulations. One of them is Public Law 92-603,which 
restricted the construction of hospital beds and 
facilities under Section 1122. State laws such as 
Certificate of Need CCON> requirements mandate prior 
approval of the establishment of new health facilities 
or the expansion of health services. 
In Florida, the Department of Health and 
Rehabilitative Services is responsible for reviewing 
applications and giving approval. Letters of intent 
regarding health facilities and services must also be 
submitted to local health councils serving the affected 
area. Thus, even the acquisition or replacement of 
certain types of equipment <i. e. CAT scanner, Nuclear 
Imaging devices, Open Heart surgery facilities> are 
under the purview of the government's administrative 
agencies. Nat all states require C. 0. N. approval. 
Hospital budgets also face review. In Florida, 
the Health Care Consumer Protection and Awareness Act 
mandated that hospital budget review be reinforced with 
regulatory provisions that allow the Hospital Cost 
Containment Board to adjust the budgets of hospitals 
whose gross revenues per adjusted admission both exceed 
their peers, and the national hospital market basket 
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index. <Market Basket Index is an estimate o~ the 
annual rate of increase in the costs of certain goods 
and services used by hospitals in the production of 
inpatient care.) The items and services used in the 
market basket index have been selected and weighted to 
reflect the effect that general price changes have on 
the hospital inpatient operating costs <HCFA, 1984>. 
The hospital budget review process is done by the 
Hospital Cost Containment Board <HCCB>, which is 
appointed by the Governor and consists of three 
consumers, three purchasers, and three providers. The 
budget review process applies to all Florida hospitals 
except those owned by the state and rehabilitation 
hospitals. These government regulations have been 
10 
directed towards efficiency as measured by costs of 
health care services capped by cost ceilings established 
per DRG for all Medicare patients. Medicaid patients 
are not on DRG reimbursement. Hospitals are reimbursed 
for Medicaid patients on a per diem basis with records 
subject to the Professional Review Organization <PRO> 
reviews and possible approval or denial of payment. 
The entire health care system faces the challenge 
of balancing what is socially equitable with issues of 
efficiency -- delivering needed health services with 
decreasing resources. With the growing popularity of 
propective payment systems <DRG-based reimbursement, 
pre+erred provider organizations, and health maintenance 
organizations), increasing competition for fewer and 
fewer government reimbursement dollars is the phenomenon 
of today. The responses o+ health care providers in the 
forprofit and nonprofit sector are multi-faceted and 
substantially complex. Hospitals may look critically at 
their internal operations where possibilities for cost-
cutting may exist. They may also examine the type of 
their patient population. Additionally, hospitals may 
identify the most common DRS classifications their 
patients fall under and whether-or-not these types o+ 
patients require so much in resources. Hospitals may 
also examine the amounts of reimbursement dollars they 
have received per DRG and may utilize such information 
to their advantage in two ways: first, by increasing 
their patient population with specific types of DRGs and 
second, by recruiting more physicians who specialize in 
diseases which pertain to the specific DRGs. These 
reactions are obviously directed at ensuring that 
reimbursed dollars exceed 7 if nat equal, the costs of 
hospital care. 
The hospital could, through its stringent 
requirements, limit medical staff privileges or revoke 
them as they see fit. In short, the medical staff may 
be limited to those who share the organization's 
philosophy of cost containment through patient 
11 
selectivity and compliance to DRG reimbursement 
limitations such as length of stay of procedures 
performed. 
This health care scenario is important in this 
analysis of nonprofit, government, and forprofit 
hospitals. Hospital ownership and subsequent 
differences in behavior have been observed in the past 
and several authors have attempted to explain them. 
P~operty RiQht• and Economic Theori•• 
A general view of property rights is equated with 
economic rights -- the right to exercise control over 
material possessions, the means of producing wealth~ and 
the ability to enter into voluntary transactions of 
exchange <Malloy, 1986>. Property rights refer to the 
sanctioned behavioral relations among men that arise 
from the existence of things and pertain to their use. 
Property rights are the expectations a person has that 
his decisions about the uses of certain resources will 
be effective. The stronger those expectations are 
upheld~ in one way or another <custom, social ostracism, 
or government punishment of violators) the stranger are 
the property rigths <Alchian and Allen, 1969). The 
prevailing system of property rights in the community 
can be desc~ibed~ then, as the set of economic and 
social relations defining the position of each 
individual with ~espect to the utilization of sca~ce 
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resources <Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972>. Traditional 
microeconomic theory takes wants and technology as 
givens and proceeds to deduce ~rom these the assumption 
a~ scarcity, testable implications and normative 
propositions <Demsetz, 1966). 
In a private property system, there is control 
over scarce resources and their use. This includes the 
right to sell or transfer control. A private property 
right system requires the prior consent of "owners .. 
be~ore their property can be affected by others. The 
political system plays a role here in two ways: ~irst, 
the government or court system helps to decide who 
possesses what property rights and therefore who has the 
power to claim control over resources; second, property 
rights so assigned are protected by the police power of 
the state. 
The primary function of property rights is to guide 
incentives toward greater internalization of 
externalities. Every cost and benefit associated with 
social interdependencies is a potential externality. 
Demsetz (1967> makes clear the role of property rights 
in the internalization of externalities. A law which 
establishes the right of a person to his freedom would 
necessitate a payment on the part of a firm or of the 
taxpayer sufficient to cover such cost. In using a 
person's labor, the same holds true. Thus the costs of 
13 
producing a good or service are internalized. Ownership 
which includes the right of sale, thus, is necessary for 
internalization. It is the prohibition o~ a property 
right adjustment, the prohibition or impossibility <as 
in National Defense & Security, Environmental Safety -
Clean Air> of the establishment of ownership title that 
can be exchanged which precludes the internalization of 
external costs and benefits. 
Th• purpa•• of th• property righ~• approach i• to 
achieve a g•n•r•liz•tian of the •tandard th•ary of 
production and •Mchang• by can•id•rinQ the 
interconnect•dn••• of own•r•hlp rights, incentive•, and 
For example, in nonprofit 
organizations, the so-called owners or trustees do not 
have the right to decide or use the organizational 
wealth for personal use -- a right which is held by 
stockholders of private, forprofit corporations. Thus, 
wealth effects are more immediate to the stockholder 
than to the owner of an enterprise without 
capitalizable, saleable property rights <Alchian, 1969). 
Clarkson (1972> pointed out that in nonproprietary 
hospitals, trustees who find it relatively less 
rewarding (compared to proprietary stockholders> to 
increase the hospital's wealth also find it relatively 
unrewarding to enforce wealth maximizing performance by 
the individuals in the hospital. Hence, managers of 
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nonproprietary hospitals will more often redistribute 
their effort towards work activities that are relatively 
more pleasant but have lower value to the organizations 
wealth. 
There are restrictions on rights to benefits of 
business transactions. Stockholders' rights to capture 
profits may be restricted, as in the case of public 
utilities. The profits of public utilities are usually 
regulated by the state (for example, Florida Power & 
Light Co.). Alchian (1969) indicated that nonprofit 
enterprises differ from profit-restricted enterprises in 
two respects. In the former, profits are not legally 
restricted and there is no restriction on entry. The 
nonprofit enterprise is entitled to retain any available 
economic profits, but its organizers may not capitalize 
the profits into personal take-home wealth. Thus, the 
nonprofit enterprise, if profitable, manifests and 
distributes net earnings via business related costs. 
Their costs may appear higher, but in fact those costs 
may be distribution of profit. 
Changes in economic values, new advances in 
technology, and new markets bring changes to property 
right arrangements. This is particularly true when the 
costs of internalization increase. Such changes are 
notable behavior patterns in the hospital environment. 
Clarkson <1972> tested differences in hospital behavior 
15 
resulting from property right arrangements. His central 
proposition is that effective constraints facing 
decision makers in proprietary hospitals differ from 
those in nonproprietary hospitals producing similar 
products and that observed differences in the 
combination of inputs used in production are direct 
consequences of differing constraints. The arrangements 
in nonproprietary nonprofit enterprises are different 
from those in proprietary, profit-seeking organizations 
because: (1) certain rights or claims to benefits in 
nonproprietary organizations are not transferable by 
sale as they are in proprietary organizations, and (2) 
managers or workers in nonprofit organizations do not 
have exclusive claim on residual products (the current 
flows of money and nonmoney benefits> that is 
characteristic of forprofit enterprises. Clarkson 
presented empirical findings to offer evidence of 
difference in (1) constraints, <2> distribution of work 
effort, (3) information used by proprietary and 
nonproprietary hospital administrators, and <4> 
variability of input selection. 
Presenting evidence of differences in proprietary 
and non-proprietary constraints, Clarkson cited the 
study of Bower and Roemer <1963). Choosing only 
hospitals with fewer than 150 beds <45 proprietary 
hospitals and 22 nonproprietary hospitals>, two 
16 
conclusions were reached: <1> that proprietary 
hospitals have less explicit bylaws and (2) differences 
in bylaws "scores .. were associated with difference& in 
hospital performance. 
Today~ rules governing hospital budget approval, 
certificate of need requirements, utilization of beds, 
quality of care, practice of physicians and hospital 
practitioners are different from the 1970 era. Health 
care policies have been directed to ensure quality, 
contain cost, and allow access. In theory, a free 
market system is efficient when there is perfect 
competition and when there are zero transaction costs. 
In general, it is an accepted nation that government 
intervention is necessary to approach this goal 
<exemplified by antitrust laws which limit rights to 
transfer and ensure fair competition>. The provision of 
health care services has been subject to numerous public 
policies applicable to all hospitals regardless of 
ownership status. For example, specific conduct of 
hospital committees must be identified in the bylaws. 
These requirements are standardized by the Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals <JCAH>. 
Minimum requirements in terms of administrators and 
those who implement patient care are specified. [For an 
indepth treatment of these standards for specific 
hospitals, please refer to the JCAH Manual on 
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Accreditation, 1987J. As health care policies change, 
so do hospital behavior patterns evolve. 
Previous property rights research implies that the 
restraint from accrual of residual profits is the 
primary source of operational differences between 
nonprofit and forprofit hospitals <Clarkson, 1972). 
Other researchers noted that the nonprofit form may not 
be the viable form of organization in today's 
competitive environment CClark, 1980; Hoff and Shaner, 
1982>. The economic incentives present in the hospital 
environment today impact on operations. Thus, hospitals 
organized as nonprofit, government, or forprofit need to 
be studied and compared. 
There are also economic theories or models about 
the behavior of orgnizations that help provide insights 
into the possible operational differences among 
hospitals. Several authors have attempted to explain 
this by providing a rationale for the production of 
services by nonprofit firms. These are: <1> 
government failure; (2) inability to evaluate quality 
or quantity; (3) consumer desire for control; <4> as a 
physician's cooperative; (5) 
for sales maxi mi zati on; <7> 
for recovery of costs; <6> 
to enhance managerial 
status or security; (8) conspicuous production; and (9) 
output maximization. 
One general view is when the private sector does 
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not produce certain goods or services, when the 
production is less than what the society desires, then 
the government supplies such services or goods <Musgrave 
and Musgrave, 1973). Additionally, these goods and 
services supplied by the government are intended to 
benefit consumers collectively rather than individually 
<Samuelson, 1967> and that all citizens have access 
<Dkun, 1975>. Failures by the government rather than 
failures by the private sector give rise to nonprofit 
organizations <Weisbrod, 1977>. This is exemplified in 
one sense by the fact that organizations known as 
nonprofit exist must serve charitable public purposes. 
The government's response to demands for public 
services is made known through the society's collective-
choice mechanisms. This implies that the presence of 
nonprofit organizations is brought about when the 
government's production does not meet the consumer's 
demands for public or quasi-public goods and services 
<Weisbrod, 1980>. Health care is provided by nonprofit, 
government, and forprofit hospitals. 
A hospital that is not owned by the government may 
be incorporated under state laws as not for profit or 
for profit. As a nonprofit organization, the hospital 
operates under exempt status [Section 501 (a) <3>, IRCl 
providing it performs a charitable, scientific, or 
educational purpose. To maintain tax-exempt status, no 
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part of the hospital·s net earnings should accrue to the 
benefit of any private shareholder or individual. 
Health institutions classified as government are owned 
and operated by federal, state or local governments. 
Government hospitals are directly or indirectly under 
the control of elected officials. Their financial 
resources for operations and capital expenditures come 
from government appropriations. Forprofit hospitals 
provide services with the intent of generating profits. 
These firms are accountable to their investors or 
stockholders who expect a return on their investment. 
The production of goods and services by nonprofit 
firms can be seen in instances when the quantity of 
goods or services can not be observed or when the 
quality can not be accurately evaluated <Bays, 1983; 
Easley and O'Hara, 1983>. Beyond this, consumer desire 
for control has been proposed as a rationale for the 
nonprofit provision of certain goods or services <Ben-
Ner, 1983). Here, consumers choose to establish their 
own organization rather than take chances in the market 
place. An intuitive hypothesis for the nonprofit form 
is that it is a beneficient response to the problems of 
consumer lack of knowledge and vulnerability <Hansman, 
1980). Another view, that of Pauly and Redisch <1973> 
explained the nonprofit hospital as a physicians· 
cooperative where their incomes could be maximized. 
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This argument, though, undermines the physician·s 
fiduciary responsibilities towards the patient and 
brings into mind whether medical practice, 
professional/ethical responsibilities can be reconciled 
with economic interests. 
Karen Davis <1970) proposed that the nonprofit 
hospitals have objectives such as recovery of costs, and 
output, quality, and cash flow maximization. With 
recovery of cost as an objective, nonprofits would set 
prices of service equal to the average cost of providing 
the service. The assumption here is that nonprofit 
organizations serve public interest and being non-profit 
making, voluntary, charitable institutions, they aim 
primarily to recover costs <Ingbar and Taylor, 1968). 
This recovery of cost philosophy is further exemplified 
in policy guidelines set forth by the American Hospital 
Association on pricing of hospital services <AHA, 1966>. 
It has been recommended that charges be set high enough 
to recover casts as well as cover funds necessary for 
plant expansion due to improvement of services required 
to keep abreast of scientific and technological 
advances. This difficulty in determining the rate of 
mark-up make empirical testing of cost-pricing 
difficult. Ordinarily, one would look at patient 
charges and this would be set equal to average operating 
costs to test the proposition that nonprofit hospitals 
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are not profit maximizers. 
Baumel <1959> argued for the sales maximization 
theory of the nonprofit firm in that managers are 
rewarded on the basis of firm revenues rather than 
profits. Finkler <1983> applied this theory to both 
nonprofit and forprofit hospitals. Hospital demand is 
modeled as a function of price and the number of 
physicians affiliated with the hospitals. Hospitals are 
believed to maximize sales subject to breakeven and 
minimum volume constraints. The constraints which face 
the forprofit hospital include the rules, regulations, 
and controls established by owners/trustees which ensure 
that the hospital services produced are the maximum for 
the associated inputs used. Hospital managers have 
delegated authority to work within these constraints. 
Clarkson's research on constr•ints(1972> were discussed 
earlier. 
In the nonprofit hospital, the owners can not accrue 
profits or assign monetary benefits to themselves or the 
managers. Since there is nonsaleability of rights to 
future benefits and the absence of residual claim to 
income from profits, there is lower cost implication 
for non-maximization of outputs in the nonprofit 
hospital <Alchian, 1969; DeAlesi, 1969). Their managers 
have weaker proprietary rights to future benefits and 
hence direct actions to current benefits, such as plush 
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office facilities and the like. 
Williamson <1981) introduced the "manager status 
and security model." He asserted that profits permit 
the firm to expand and this also provides prestige and 
status to the manager. This model predicted that the 
firm will favor certain factors of production and will 
produce some outputs beyond profit-maximizing levels --
behavior patterns attributed to the nonprofit firm and 
which implies nonefficient production. This study is 
quite similar to an earlier study by Lin <1971). 
Lin <1971> asserted that in the classic competitive 
model, the concept of profit maximization provided an 
effective assumption about the behavior of business 
firms. He argued that most hospitals are not profit-
oriented enterprises. He advanced the conspicuous 
production theory of hospital behavior. His study 
assumes that as a producer of health care, each 
hospital has a desired status and an actual status. The 
hospital attempts to minimize the gap between its 
desired status and its prevailing status. It postulates 
defensive behavior on the part of hospitals. 
that hospitals can be seen with duplication, 
Lin argued 
averequipment, and overcapacity. Increase in inputs 
has been seen without associated increase in output. 
As such, net revenue and profit maximization do not 
provide a satisfactory explanation because without an 
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increase in output, increased input expenditures have 
nat been accompanied by increased revenue. 
To the contrary, output maximization is proposed to 
explain the behavior of nonprofit hospitals by Long 
(1964>, Klarman (1965>, Reder <1965>, Newhouse <1970), 
and Feldstein (1971>. Long (1964> noted that nonprofit 
hospitals maximize the number of patients seen subject 
to financial limits specified by the sponsoring agency. 
Klarman <1965) reiterated the argument that voluntary 
hospitals maximize the welfare of society by serving as 
many patients as possible subject to certain specified 
limits on deficits. Reder (1965) asserted that 
hospitals tend to be run as though their objective was 
to maximize the weighted number of patients treated per 
time period. Newhouse (1970) proposed an economic model 
of nonprofit hospital as a quantity and quality 
maximizer -- these were considered as elements of the 
decision-maker's maximands. There is concern for 
quantity of services because the nonprofit institution 
exists for a social purpose, receives donations, and tax 
exemption privileges. The element of quality is 
justified in using the line of reasoning that the laws 
of decision-making in the hospital rest on a board of 
trustees and the medical staff. Feldstein (1971) viewed 
the utilization of hospital resources in such a way that 
quantity af output is maximized <given quality> with the 
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doctor as an independent agent of the patient. 
To recapitulate, explanations regarding the 
differences in hospital performance include: the 
development of nonprofit hospitals as a function of the 
government's inability to meet consumer demand 
<Weisbrod, 1980>; as a physician's cooperative <Pauly 
and Redisch, 1973>; and nonprofit hospitals aim to 
recover costs or maximize output, quality, and cash flow 
< Da vi s , 1 970 > • Other theorists <Baumel, 1959; Finkler, 
1983) provided explanations such as sales maximization; 
while Alchian (1969) and DeAlesi (1969) rationalized 
that the nonsaleability of rights to future benefits and 
the absence of residual claim to income from profits 
imply lower cost implication for non-maximization of 
outputs in the nonprofit hospital. The conspicuous 
production theory of hospital behavior was raised by Lin 
<1971) and concluded that net revenue and profit 
maximization do not provide a satisfactory explanation 
because without an increase in output, increased input 
does not result in increased revenue. Along similar 
lines as Lin, Williamson (1981) explained the 
nonefficient production in the nonprofit hospital using 
a .. manager status and security model ... Long <1964>, 
Klarman <1965>, and Reder <1965) proposed the quantity 
maximization model of the nonprofit hospital, while 
Newhouse <1970> introduced quality as a maximand in the 
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decision-making process. Feldstein <1971> considered 
quality as a given in output maximization. 
These economic models, thus far, do not examine the 
differences in products <health services). In standard 
economic theory, assuming a co~etitive model, a firm 
that wants to maximize profits will produce outputs 
saleable at market price to anyone willing to pay the 
set price and anyone who can afford to pay. This 
implies that goods and services are distributed in 
accordance with the existing income distribution. 
A voluminous amount of literature has been 
discussed. For clarity, let me point out that these can 
be grouped into two. One group is the set o+ economic 
models which relate to quantity maximization and the 
other to quality maximization. Several studies were 
related to the emphasis on increasing units of service 
or output. These models, thus far, do not consider 
exogenous changes in the environment, nor are sources of 
change considered. The determination of outputs are not 
clear and the pursuit of status, prestige, and security 
seem to portray hospitals in less than a professional, 
humanitarian way. With Newhouse's model <1970>, some 
rational explanation was attempted with consideration of 
a very important dimension of service -- quality. One 
problem with this model is the failure to clearly 
identify what quality of inputs or outputs were being 
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considered. Feldstein <1971> relied heavily on the 
demand and supply market mechanism and attempted to 
explain hospital cost inflation in this manner as well. 
Pauly and Redisch (1973> modeled the nonprofit 
institution as a physician's cooperative and suggested 
that there are residual profits <not to trustees) to 
physicians. An implication of this would be that the 
decision-making in the nonprofit hospital would be 
biased to the benefit of the physician. As a 
consequence, it is likely that costs of care would be 
higher since there is no incentive to keep costs d~n. 
[Note: If the hospital administration decreased patient-
staff ratio, there may be operational inefficiencies 
which may not help the physician economize on his own 
time. For example, if a laboratory is unable to process 
the results of a test right away because of 
understaffing, the physician would have to wait longer 
and would not be able to see all of the patients within 
a shorter period of time.] 
Using the property rights theory to explain 
differences in hospital behavior, Clarkson (1972> shed 
some light on the choices made by administrators. This 
work, unfortunately, can not withstand the test o+ time. 
The hospitals today, nonprofit as well as forprofit, are 
in an environment where there are pressures to deliver 
ca~e at a certain level of quality. Additionally, the 
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financial constraints <through prospective payment 
rather than retrospective payment> have been imposed 
to ensure cost containment. 
The literature cited thus far predates DRGs. 
Empirical analyses tested implications for property 
right arrangements in settings were cost containment 
rules and reimbursement ceilings have not been in place. 
To gain better insight on hospital organizational form 
and its relationship to operational differences, several 
studies are discussed below which describe certain 
behavioral patterns by ownership type. Although the 
studies do not specifically relate differences to 
property right arrangements, they do provide some bases 
for the use of certain variables in the subsequent 
analyses. 
Compa~a~iv• Studt•• 
This section deals with differences in trends of 
growth, size, insurance payers, costs, and charges by 
type of ownership. 
Hospital Trends. There is a growing trend in the 
proliferation of forprofit hospitals <American Hospital 
Association [AHAJ, 1985). As of 1982, the number of 
proprietary hospitals constituted 14.1% of all U. S. 
hospitals and 8.2'l. of all beds. In Florida, the number 
of nongovernment, nonprofit hospitals decreased from 206 
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in 1982 to 84 in 1985 while the forprofit~ investor 
o~ned hospitals increased from 48 in 1982 to 73 in 1984 
<AHA 1982 and 1984>. 
The expansion of investor-owned hospitals has been 
observed in areas of gro~ing demand for services 
<Mullner, Ross~ and Hadley~ 1984). The sun-belt area 
<California, Texas~ and Florida) she~ 46X of all 
investor-owned hospitals <Federation of American 
Hospitals [FAHJ~ 1984>. As a percentage of non-federal, 
short-term general and other special hospitals by state, 
the states of Nevada and Florida show the highest 
investor-o~ned hospitals, with 507. and 447. respectively 
<FAH, 1984). Population, per capita income, and 
insurance coverage, as well as size, are factors in 
investor-ownership of hospitals (Lewin, et. al., 1981 
and Watt~ et. al., 1986>. Thus, it is not surprising 
that certain geographic areas are found to have 
hospitals ~ith a disproportionate number of nonprofit, 
government, and forprofit hospitals. 
Hospital Size. American Hospital Association 1984 
statistics show that of 252 hospitals in Florida, there 
were 74 hospitals ~ith bed capacities of less than 100, 
73 hospitals with 100-199 beds, and 43 hospitals with 
200-299 beds. Ferber (1971) noted that there were fewer 
clear distinctions between chain-operated and non-
profits except for those attributable to size. Investor-
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owned hospitals show selectivity in the size of 
hospitals they acquire or construct, this being affected 
by health planning agencies in the area of location as 
well as certificate of need requirements. 
The importance of bed size is underscored for the 
simple reason that services offered may vary according 
to size. Dealing with the question of optimal size for 
hospitals, Berry <1973) noted that basic service 
hospitals <BSH> tend to have an average size well below 
50. The author related the increasing average bed size 
to the availability of quality enhancing services 
(QESH>, complex scope of services <CSSH>, and provision 
of community services <CSH>. The study results are 
meaningful and worth noting. For BSH, the mean bed size 
was 43; QESH with 93; CSSH with 231; and CSH with 450. 
This study showed that there was a clear relationship 
between the availability of facilities and ~~rvices and 
the capacity of hospitals to provide s~~cific services. 
A clear relationship betwee.~ the provision of specific 
services and hos~;tal costs was also shown. 
Groner (1979) studied proprietary chain hospitals 
and found that by virtue of their size, these hospitals 
can afford to pay for and are able to assign resource 
people which an individual hospital cannot afford to 
do. The proprietary chain hospitals are, therefore, able 
to prepare for contingencies and take advantage of 
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opportunities which may arise. 
Bed size, as a factor in the analysis a+ hospital 
performance, was also noted in another study <Pattison 
and Katz, 1983). In the study population, total assets 
per available bed were 15% lower in investor-owned chain 
hospitals than in voluntary institutions. Total assets 
reflected the measure of capital resources needed to 
produce an inpatient year of service. However, it 
should be painted out that with bed size, occupancy 
rates vary. Thus, the analysis could be particularly 
problematic with large scale samples with state or 
nationwide variations. 
Insurance Payers. Ruchlin, Painter, and Cannedy 
(1973) reported nonprofit facilities as having a greater 
proportion of their third-party payor revenues coming 
from city, county, state, and federal sources than their 
farprofit counterparts. Forprofit hospitals may 
favor patients who have the ability to pay with private 
insurance. A recent study of Pattison and Katz <1983) 
[using California data 1977-1982] revealed that in a 
cost-based reimbursement system, Medicare and Medicaid 
programs reimburse the hospitals for 11 reasonable costs 11 
of providing care to their patients <including a 11 return 
an equity .. payment to proprietary hospitals but not to 
non-profit institutions>. They found, though, that the 
payer class of patients did not differ significantly 
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according to hospital ownership category. 
The literature underscores the importance of bed 
size. The payer class of patients might vary depending 
on location. Certainly, the population of 
predominantly aged 65 years and over will reflect a 
larger number of Medicare enrollees. 
Costs and Charges. Bays <1979>, using California 
data from 1971-1972, found that forprofit hospitals are 
significantly less costly than nonprofits after 
accounting for differences in case mix. This 
interpretation, though, is complicated by the systematic 
overtreatment of certain case types by independent, or 
nonchain forprofits. It is crucial to control for this 
and the use of diagna•i• r•lated graup• <DRG•> has been 
done in other studies. 
Lewin, et. al. (1981) studied twelve selected 
diagnoses for both hospital types. Using 1978 Medicare 
cost reports for California, Texas, and Florida, fifty 
matched pairs of hospitals were compared. The findings 
revealed that forprofit chain hospitals were 23 percent, 
17 percent, and 13 percent higher than the nonprofits 
in price per inpatient day, price per inpatient 
admission day for charge payers and price per inpatient 
day for cost payer, respectively. The in-patient 
charges in investor-owned hospitals were 8 percent 
higher for routine and 36 percent higher for ancillary 
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services per admission. Expenses per day were 13 percent 
higher. 
Pattison and Katz (1983>, using data supplied by 
the California Health Facilities Commission in 1980, 
compared the economic performance of investor-owned and 
not-for-profit hospitals in California. The principal 
findings were: (1) during the study period, 
both casts and charges were higher in forprofit than in 
nonprofit hospitals (measured in patient days [297.] or 
admi ssi an [247.] >; (2) the forprofit chains have used 
aggressive marketing and pricing strategies to generate 
high rates of profitability and growth. 
Some arguments against cost studies have been that 
case mix differences are not accounted for. Frick, 
Martin, and Shwartz <1985>, using 1979 data from the New 
York State Office of Health Systems Management, 
compared case loads of 11 teaching and 20 nonteaching 
hospitals. 
grouping• <DRS•> ~c analyz• th• •Mt•nt ta ~hich c•••-miM 
differenc•• contribute ta diff•r•nc•• in averag• caet 
p•r c:•••• their findings indicated that the case-mix 
differences explain one-fourth of the higher average 
cost per case in teaching hospitals. 
Watt, et. al. (1986> examined the differences in 
the economic performance of 80 matched pairs of investor-
owned chain and not-for-profit hospitals in eight states 
33 
during 1978 and 1980, and considered how their operating 
strategies might affect their relative success in a more 
price-conscious market [Data analysis used student's ~­
test to investigate the null hypotheses.]. The findings 
suggest that total charges (adjusted for case mix) and 
net ~evenues per case were bath significantly higher in 
the investor-owned chain hospitals, mainly because of 
highe~ cha~ges for ancillary services. There were no 
significant differences between the two groups of 
hospitals in ~egard to patient-care costs per case 
(adjusted for case mix>, but the investor-owned 
hospitals have significantly higher administrative 
overhead casts; investor-owned hospitals were more 
profitable; investor-owned hospitals had fewer employees 
per occupied bed but paid more per employee; investor-
owned hospitals had funded more of their capital through 
debt and had significantly higher capital costs in 
proportion to their operating costs; and the two groups 
did not differ in patient mix, as measured by their 
Medicare case-mix indexes or the proportions of their 
patients covered by Medicare or Medicaid. The authors 
concluded that investor-owned chain hospitals generated 
higher profits through more aggressive pricing practices 
rather than operating efficiencies. 
In sum, several trends in the hospital industry 
have been identified. These are the increasing number 
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of forprofit hospitals, bed size as an important factor 
in analyzing the differences in performance, and the 
role of insurance payers in hospital behavior. The 
literature comparing costs and charges has dealt with 
data before DRS-based reimbursement was put in effect 
<Tefra Act was signed into law in October, 1982>. This 
meant that hospitals were reimbursed for patient care 
charges according to what they bill for. Now that the 
reimbursement system has changed, i. e. with fixed 
prices per DRG, a hospital may charge any amount of 
money but they will be reimbursed at a set price. Thus, 
comparisons of hospitals by ownership status before the 
new prospective payment system was in effect show 
differences in times when hospitals did not have much 
incentive to control costs of care. 
The empirical evidence points to the higher charges 
on the part of the forprofit hospitals. Thus far, one 
might be tempted to draw causal linkages between the 
ownership status and resulting operational differences 
with existing property right arrangements. The 
restraint on rights to residual in the nonprofit sector 
may account for the lower charges. The nonprofit sector 
is assumed to pursue goals other than profit, such as 
charitable goals for the benefit of social good. 
creates an important dimension in distinguishing 
nonprofit hopitals. Tax-exemption laws impose 
This 
35 
restrictions on the purposes ~or which nonprofit 
corporations can be organized and operated [See Section 
501 (c) <3> Internal Revenue Code.]. To understand 
further the behavior of the nonprofit hospital, let us 
examine related concepts such as education and research. 
Education and Research. Activities such as 
education and research enhance organizational prestige 
<Goss, 1970). Costs to support such activities may come 
from grants or donations -- for the nonprofit 
hospital. The conduct or support of research is 
considered charitable -- for the public good. It was 
not until recently that forprofit organizations became 
eligible to receive research grants from the National 
Institutes of Health. Generating funds ~or research 
purposes come from government grants or charitable 
contributions both of which forprofit hospitals are not 
the preferred recipients. Additionally, there are 
numerous moral, ethical, and legal concerns associated 
with research activities on human subjects. This makes 
research participation on a small scale difficult. As 
mentioned earlier, most forprofit hospitals are smaller 
in size and may not have substantial resources to 
support a full time research staff. 
Hospitals are either teaching or non-teaching. 
Affiliation with major universities make the hospital 
the site for training for students of nursing, medicine, 
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biochemistry, and allied health sciences. Educational 
goals <considered charitable and furthering public 
purpose) have been associated with beth government and 
nonprofit hospitals. There are several factors which 
could have led to this trend. Government hospitals and 
nonprofit religious organizations were first in the 
industry to establish themselves in communities. By 
virtue of their size, various specialties can be made 
readily available for practitioners. Clinical practice 
requires certain types of specialties such as 
opthalmology, otorhinolaryngology, gastroenterology, 
pulmonary, cardiovascular, orthopedics, genito-urinary, 
endocrinology, musculo-skeletal, neurology, internal 
medicine, surgery, and pathology. The amount of 
resources <physical, human, and financial> necessary to 
provide the majority, if not all of these services 
obviously impact on the costs of delivering care in 
these hospitals. Hospital Data Center (1985> statistics 
showed the average number of residents and trainees per 
community hospital in 1983 as follows: state and local 
government hospitals with 300-399 beds had 48~; 400-499 
beds with 93/.; and 500-599 beds with 1967. (percent 
expresses that average number of residents and trainees 
per hospital bed>. 
It is common knowledge that forprofit hospitals 
hardly participate in teaching. In 1983, short-term 
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forprofit general hospitals with medical and nursing 
school a?filiations consisted of 4~ [Nonprofits = 4o'l.; 
Government= 30Xl <AHA, 1985>. Teaching activities are 
considered costly and logically, if the generation of 
profits is the primary goal of a hospital, it would be 
difficult to substantiate carrying on an activity that 
does not increase return on investment to shareholders. 
Additionally, there are institutional concerns regarding 
the legal implications and the potential vulnerability 
of the hospital to laNsuits in the event of malpractice 
incidents (since student nurses and physicians are 
unlicensed practitioners>. 
The costs incurred in providing teaching impact on 
patient charges. Jones (1985> conducted a study in one 
large university teaching hospital, comparing four DRG 
categories. The findings show significantly higher 
charges for patients with faculty attending physicians 
placed on a teaching service as compared to private, non-
teaching patients. Frick and others <1985) compared 
eleven teaching and twenty non-teaching hospitals using 
383 original DRGs and found that costs per case in 
teaching hospitals are 60/. higher than nonteaching 
hospitals. 
The preceding ~eiterates two points: first, the 
prope~ty right arrangement for nonprofit hospitals to 
encourage and further charitable, public pu~poses; and 
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second, forprofit hospitals will attempt to avoid 
activities <Note: Administrative decision-makers in the 
forprofit hospital are accountable to stockholders.> 
which are non-revenue producing <unless there are 
government subsidies for them>. These phenomena are 
functions of the socio-political-legal-economic 
arrangement today in the health care environment. 
Perhaps things would have been different if the 
situation were reversed -- if federal and property tax 
exemptions, tax-exempt bonds for financing capital 
expenditures, and charitable donations were assigned to 
forprafit hospitals also. This would make the playing 
field equal and the pure analysis of hospital behavior 
in the light of property rights may allow causal 
linkage. 
Recent changes in health care policies, though, 
create new pressures for cost control and moderation in 
charges -- to which both types of hospitals must adapt. 
Numerous studies in the literature examined the hospital 
environment before the inception of the Tax Equity and 
Fiscal Responsibiltiy Act of 1982. So although these 
studies give us insight into relevant variables which 
might be considered in future studies, applicability in 
today·s competitive environment is limited. 
The discussion in the ~allowing chapter focuses on 
the framework for analyses of hospital behavior under 
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DRGs to test implications of the property rights theory 
to efficiency, equity, and quality of care. 
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CHAPTER III 
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
In relating the di~ferences of property right 
arrangements to hospital ownership status, data are 
examined to determine whether or not significant 
differences exist among nonprofit, government, and 
forprofit hospitals in the context of efficiency, 
equity, and quality of care. The schematic diagram 
below illustrates the analysis: 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 
I 
I 
--------------------------------------------1 I I 
Government Nonprofit Forprofit 
-Institutional Variables 
<Service Type, Bed Size, Location> 
I I 
Quality 
Occupancy Rates 
Ancillary Expense 
Bad Debts 
Manhours/Pt. Day 
Salaries/FTE 
Length of Stay/DRG 
Charges/DRG 
Reimbursements/DRG 
Equity 
Medicare Days 
Medicaid Days 
Uncomp. Care 
Death 
Rates/DRG 
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The intent here, is to derive and test implications 
about differences in hospital behavior in the context of 
efficiency, equity, and quality. The differences in 
property right arrangements are explained as: rights to 
residual profits in the forprofit hospitals, and the tax 
exemption status on the part of nonprofit and government 
hospitals. This tax exemption status is tied in to the 
obligation to serve charitable purposes in the public 
interest. 
There is reason to believe that the rights to 
residual profits in the forprofit sector might result in 
greater efficiency. The immediate effects of profit 
maximization is considered an incentive for managers in 
the forprofit hospital. Thus, performance of the 
forprofits compared to nonprofit and government 
hospitals may be different. The indicators of 
efficiency might be reflected as: increased occupancy 
rates, decreased ancillary expenditures, decreased bad 
debts, decreased manhours per patient day, higher 
salaries per FTE, decreased average length o~ stay per 
DRG, increased charges per DRG, and higher 
reimbursements per DRG. 
The goals and social obligations attached to the 
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tax-exemption status can be argued as the underlying 
rationale for output maximization, i. e. maximizing 
benefits to society by serving more patients. To 
examine the behavior of hospitals in this regard, equity 
variables are used. These are the number o~ Medicare 
days, the number of Medicaid days, and the amount of 
uncompensated care provided. The nonprofit and 
government hospitals are expected to have higher 
Medicare and Medicaid days, as well as provide more 
uncompensated care. Let us consider some possible 
interactions among these variables. 
Nonprofit and government hospitals, along the lines 
of output maximization, might be seen with larger bed 
size, consequently these hospitals might be expected to 
have higher occupancy rates, ancillary expenses, bad 
debts, manhours per patient day, lower salaries per FTE, 
longer lengths of stay per DRG, lower charges per DRG, 
and lower reimbursements per DRG. The expectation that 
nonprofit and government hospitals should provide 
services to Medicare and Medicaid patients as well as 
uncompensated care might lead to increased occupancy 
rates, ancillary expenses, bad debts, manhours, and 
longer lengths of stay. On the other hand, forprofit 
hospitals with lower bed capacities might be observed 
with lower Medicare days, Medicaid days, and 
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uncompensated care which impact an occupancy rates, the 
amount of ancillary expenses, and bad debts. 
The quality of care delivered in nonprofit, 
government, and farprofit hospitals is seen as a 
function of regulatory requirements and the fiduciary 
responsibility that rests on hospital decision makers. 
A certain level of quality is conceptualized as similar 
among hospitals regardless of ownership status since: 
(1) a standard level of care is mandated by government 
agencies such as the Department of Health and 
Rehabilitative Services; <2> that for purposes of this 
study using death rates per DRG as an indicator an 
exceptional rise in death rates will bring 
investigations and affect hospital reputation adversely; 
and lastly, (3) the extent of services 
requiresexpenditures which are under budgetary 
constraints <such as DRGs> for all hospital types. 
The following discussion will explain the 
rationale and justification for the variables used in 
this analysis in seeking evidence in support of the 
property rights theory. 
In•tituticnal Variabl•• 
Hospitals differ in many repects other than 
ownership. These are in terms of services offered, bed 
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size and location. 
Types of services. Hospitals may o+fer specialty 
services such as rehabilitation, psychiatry, general, 
or pediatrics. Services hospitals provide may vary or 
may be limited to a certain extent for reasons such as 
in the case of the +orprofit hospital>: ( 1 ) certain 
services may be unprofitable, <2> certain services may 
require more resources (human, capital, equipment, 
technology>, or certain types of resources speci+ic to 
the service. The existence of appropriate types of 
equipment and technology parallels the services offered 
in a hospital 1. e. whether it is a specialty hospital 
(rehabilitation, psychiatry, or pediatric) or if it 
offers acute or long-term care. 
This analysis will focus an acute care, general 
hospitals only. Further controls for types of patients 
treated are necessary. Consequently, the top t~enty DRG 
categories common to all hospitals in the study will be 
used. 
DRGs are a classification system which groups 
similar types of patients together based upon diagnostic 
and therapeutic characteristics. Each DRG is intended 
to imply equal resource consumption for patients 
belonging to a certain category. Numerous arguments 
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have been raised by the medical and hospital community 
against the validity of using the classification system 
to assign payments. 
One o~ the major points raised in most empirical 
analyses o~ hospitals is severity o~ illness, that DRG 
assignments are not specific enough. Let us analyze the 
major patient data elements which a~~ect the DRG 
assignment and provide justification for its use <CFR, 
1985>. There are six of them: (1) Principal 
Diagnosis: the condition established after study to 
chiefly responsible for the admission o~ the patient to 
the hospital for care. The principal diagnosis is 
utilized to identify the appropriate major diagnostic 
category <MDC>. MDCs are organized by body systems. 
(2) Operating Room/Surgical Procedure: is a major 
decision point in DRG assignment. An operating room 
procedure di~ferentiates the type of resources a patient 
receives and generally denotes a higher reimbursement. 
Every MDC (except no. 15 and 20) is split into surgical 
or medical groups based upon the presence or absence of 
an operating room procedure. (3) Age: affects 254 of 
467 reimbursable DRGs. There are three major categories 
applied: 0- 17 & 18 pediatric and adult age 
distinction; 0 - 69 ~ 70 most common age division; and 
0 -35 & 36 applicable only to diabetes patients; DRG 294 
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and 295. Age groupings are significant in that medical 
resource consumption will vary dependent upon patient 
age. <4> Complications/Co-Morbidities are de+ined as 
secondary conditions which increase the patients' length 
of stay by at least 1 day in 75X of the patients. A 
separate complications/co-morbidities list has been 
developed for DRG assignment in 210 of 467 DRGs. CS> 
Sex is a determinant of DRG assignment when a specific 
DRG affects only one type of sex. (6) Discharge Status 
<expired, transferred to an acute care facility, or 
leaving a hospital against medical advice> affects only 
DRG assignments in MDC 5 <Diseases and Disorders of the 
Circulatory System>, 15 <Newborns and Other Neonates 
with Conditions Originating in the Perinatal Period), 20 
<Substance Abuse and Substance Induced Organic Mental 
Disorders) and 22 <Burns). The complexity of the 
classification is obvious. Analysis of hospital 
behavior is made difficult because of differences in 
outputs or products produced. The use of the top twenty 
DRGs common to all hospitals will allow a common ground 
for comparison. 
The types of services each hospital offers is 
controlled for in this study by means of selection (i.e. 
only acute care, general hospitals will be included) and 
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through analyses of the twenty diagnosis related groups 
common to all hospitals for the variables length of 
stay, charges per DRG, reimbursements per DRG, and death 
rates per DRG. 
Bed Size [BEDS - Hypothesis All. 
A-tHo: There are no differences among nonprofit, 
government, and forpro~it hospitals in terms of bed 
size. 
A-1H1: There are differences among nonprofit, 
government, and forprofit hospitals in terms of bed 
size. 
Selectivity in the size of the hospital has been 
demonstrated in previous studies <Ferber, 1971>. In the 
State of Florida, there are a total of 50,736 total 
beds. Of these nonprofit hospitals have 23,471, 
government hospitals have 11,045, and forprofit 
hospitals have 15,720 beds <HCCB, 1984>. American 
Hospital Association <1984> national data for the State 
of Florida showed that of 252 hospitals, there were 74 
hospitals with bed capacities less than 100, 73 with 100-
199 beds, and 43 ~ith 200-299 beds. Of these 85 ~ere 
nonprofit, 57 were government, and 73 were investor-
owned <acute care, general hospitals>. The mean bed 
s1ze for acute care, general hospitals in Florida is 
257. Both nonprofit and government hospitals are larger 
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with mean bed capacities of 381 and 375 respectively. 
In contrast, the forprofit hospitals were significantly 
smaller with mean bed size of 213 <Sorrentino, 1985). 
Bed capacity variation among hospitals also imply 
differences in resource requirements. It was made clear 
on page 29 that bed size is related to differences in 
facilities, services offered, hospital costs, and 
resources used <Ferber, 1971; Berry, 1973; Pattison and 
Katz, 1983>. Small hospitals will tend to use less 
resources than would a large medical center. There is 
reason to suspect that forprofit hospitals may limit bed 
size. With output maximization, nonprofit and 
government hospitals would expand their services and 
thus have more beds <See pages 24-26>. Property rights 
theory leads us to suspect this in regard to bed size. 
Thus, bed size remains an interesting and important 
institutional variable in the study of 
behavior. 
Location (LOC - Hypothesis A2J. 
hospital 
A-2Ho: There are no differences among nonprofit, 
government, and forprofit hospitals in terms of 
location. 
A-2H1: There are differences among nonprofit, 
government, and forprofit hospitals in terms of 
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location. 
Rural counties are characterized by low population 
density and assumed to have shortages of both health 
manpower and health service delivery systems. The 
sparse population in the rural areas might make it less 
attractive to private forprofit investors to build 
hospitals there. On the other hand, one could argue 
that there is less competition in these areas <as 
compared to the urban areas>. In this case, one can 
dictate the pricing system for health services and 
control the market. Another aspect o~ this would be 
attracting enough manpower <MDs and Nurses> to provide 
the service. A rationale for migration to these areas 
has been offered in that there would be greater 
opportunities for advancement because competition is 
less, MDs may have lower malpractice insurance costs and 
it may be easier to obtain medical staff privileges in 
these hospitals. The urban poor population in inner 
cities do have problems as well. For example, the 
mortality rate for infants in urban poverty areas is 50'l. 
higher than in nonpoverty areas <Rudov and Santangelo, 
1979>. The health needs also differ because of the 
prevalence of certain diseases in particular areas. 
Tuberculosis is three times more prevalent in poverty 
areas; young adults and middle-aged people earning less 
so 
than $5000 pe~ year had 301. mo~e chronic illness and 507. 
higher ~ates of diabetes, hype~tension, and visual 
impairment than people in the same age cohort earning 
more than $5000 and that disability is strongly 
correlated with poverty. Additionally, making informed 
decisions regarding health needs for the urban poor is 
unlikely. Lack of knowledge regarding disease risk 
factors and medical services offer a serious impediment 
to the urban poor <Kane, et. al., 1979). 
It has been shown in the literature that forprofit 
hospitals do not avoid counties with relatively high 
poverty or nonwhite populations. More forprofit 
hospitals <compared to nonprofit hospitals) are located 
in counties with slightly higher rates of poverty and 
nonwhite populations <Watt, et. al., 1986). These 
differences, though, were not statistically significant. 
Property rights theory would lead us to suspect that 
profit-driven hospitals may select locations where there 
is a profitable market for services; this study will 
test for this. 
The institutional variables service type, bed size, 
and location have been described and the rationale for 
their use specified. In particular, the population 
selection and subsequent analyses of hospitals on the 
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different dependent variables using the institutional 
variables as controls are explained in the methodology 
section. 
Efficiency Variable• 
Property right arrangements and ownership status 
are related to the variables identified in the context 
of efficiency. Controlling variables far these analyses 
will be discussed in the methodology section. The 
following hypotheses will be tested: 
B-Ho: There are no differences among nonprofit, 
government, and forprofit hospitals on occupancy rates 
CBlHoJ, ancillary expences [B2HoJ, bad debts [B3Hol, 
manhours per patient day [B4Hol, salaries per FTE 
[85HoJ, lengths of stay per DRG [86HoJ, charges per DRG 
(B7HoJ, and reimbursements per DRG [B8HoJ. 
8-Hl: There are differences among nonprofit, 
government, and farprofit hospitals on occupancy rates 
[BlHlJ, ancillary expences [82H1J, bad debts [83H1J, 
manhours per patient day [84H1], salaries per FTE 
[85H1J, lengths of stay per DRG (B6H1J, charges per DRG 
[87H1J, and reimbursements per ORG CB8H1J. 
There are certain expectations regarding 
differences in hospital behavior related to ownership 
status. One is that economic incentives in the 
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forprofit hospital may be associated with efficient use 
of resources. The other is that while rights to 
residuals do not exist for the nonprofit and government 
hospital, there may be other reasons why there may 
be nonefficient production in the nonprofit hospital 
(Note pages 14-19>. 
It must be clarified that contrary to its 
nomenclature, nonprofit hospitals are not restricted 
from earning profits. It is the prohibition of the 
right to residual by organizational members that account 
for the fundamental distinction. No individual, 
including the board, can exercise 11 ownership rights .. in 
the hospital's assets as shareholders. As previously 
proposed, it is this restraint of ownership rights to 
residual profits that accounts for operational 
differences among nonprofit, government, and forprofit 
hospitals. As mentioned earlier, Clarkson (1972> 
identified different constraints, distribution of work 
effort, information use, and variable input selection 
that account for differences in hospital performance. 
There is reason to believe that the present regulatory 
environment with changed incentives for all hospitals 
regardless of ownership status will encourage the 
efficient use of resources. This will be reflected and 
seen in several variables used as indicators of 
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efficiency in this study. At this point, the direction 
of these differences will not be discussed. As we 
uncover evidence in this regard, further analysis to 
determine whether one hospital type is more efficient 
than another <using the variable applicable in this 
regard> will be done. 
The literature cited is replete with studies that 
predate DRGs. In a regulated environment that 
encourages hospitals to deliver care at a cost which 
meets or does not exceed fixed reimbursement, the 
scenario becomes interesting. The reason is that 
nonprofit and government hospitals may not have rights 
to residual profits but the budget constraints with DRGs 
may act as a pressure to limit services and 
expenditures. This means that the ability of these 
hospitals to provide services can only be maximized to 
the extent allowed by their budget. The hospital 
behavior is now examined in the context of efficiency by 
looking at the following variables: occupancy rates, 
ancillary expenses, bad debts, manhours per patient day, 
salaries per FTE, length of stay per DRG Con twenty 
DRGs>, charges per DRG <on twenty DRGs>, and 
reimbursements per DRG (on twenty DRGs>. 
Occupancy Rates [DCC - Hypothesis Bll. Occupancy 
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rates reflect the number of patients occupying the 
hospitals beds throughout the year. It is the seasonal 
character of hospital occupancy in Florida that make for 
lower occupancy rates during the summer in some areas. 
In 1984, occupancy levels in Florida declined from 73.6X 
in 1983 to 73.0X in 1984. However, this 1984 occupancy 
level remains higher than 1979 occupancy levels <68.57.) 
in the State <HCCB, 1984>. In 1985, mean occupancy 
rates for acute care, general hospitals with 100 beds 
and over in Florida <N=160> was 64 h <Sorrentino, 1985>. 
An indicator of economic performance, occupancy 
rates have long been used to make projections regarding 
a hospital's ability to meet break-even points, 
operational lasses, or profits. Consequently, forprofit 
hospitals would attempt to maximize their occupancy 
rates to maintain a reasonable level of profitability. 
The nonprofit and government hospitals would attempt to 
ensure that their occupancy rates are maintained at a 
level where outputs are maximized subject to budgetary 
constraints. 
Ancillary Expenses [ANCI - Hypothesis B2J. 
Forprofits are entitled to saleability of rights, as 
well as sharing of profits made (as incentives to 
minimize expenses and gain profits>. In the provision 
of inpatient services, costs for ancillary services and 
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their utilization can be allowed to reach either a break 
even paint or lowered (where professional standards of 
care are met and potential threats to lawsuits or 
patient safety avoided>, ensuring profits <Ancillary 
Expenses used as an indicator). Ancillary services 
include diagnostic or therapeutic services performed by 
specific departments as distinguished from general or 
routine patient care such as room and board. Generally, 
ancillary services are those special services for which 
charges are customarily made in addition to routine 
charges and include services such as laboratory, 
radiology, and surgical services CHCCB, 1985). 
If forprofit hospitals are to gain profits, they 
may decrease use of ancillary services to minimize 
costs of production. Nonprofit and government hospitals 
do not necessarily have to make profits but 
reimbursement constraints limit utilization of ancillary 
More services to the point allowable under DRG rules. 
importantly, budgetary constraints also limit 
appropriations far certain services in the government 
hospital. The earlier discussion on the relationship of 
basic services, complexity and extent of services 
offered, and increasing costs per patient day <Berry, 
1973) points to the fact that the production of goods at 
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a fair market value depends on expenditures incurred. 
In the study cited earlier <Watt, 1986>, you will recall 
that the ~indings suggested that total charges and net 
revenues per case were higher in investor-owned chain 
hospitals due to higher charges for ancillary services. 
The analysis for this study does not look at ancillary 
charges per case because the relevance of charges have 
limited applicability when one considers a fixed-rate 
prospective payment system. When r·ei mbursement to a 
hospital for expenses in~urred is fixed, then a profit-
maximizing hospital, in theory, will minimize expenses 
to insure profitability. Thus, looking at overall 
expenditures for ancillary services offered per hospital 
over one year will allow us to see if this behavior is 
true of forprofit hospitals. 
Bad Debts CDEBT - Hypothesis 83]. The payment for 
health care incurred is obtained either through Medicare 
for the elderly, through Medicaid for the indigents, or 
through private insurance companies. Bad debts for non-
Medicare patients is not an allowable cost under 
Medicare's cost-based reimbursement rules. If hospitals 
continue to provide care that is not paid far, these 
costs will have to be borne by themselves. Logically, 
the hospital may limit services only to those able to 
pay. Some hospitals may elect not to accept 
11 Charity .. 
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patients or may set quotas. This has occurred in south 
Florida where it is alledged that some investor-owned 
hospitals have dumped Medicare, Medicaid, and charity 
patients an the nonprofit hospitals (Johnson, 1982 and 
Demkovich, 1982>. 
The financing of health care for those who are 
unable to pay depends on the resources of health care 
providers. Current reimbursement rules today reflect 
the shift of responsibility far care away from the 
public sector <Government hospitals are considered 
providers of health care). Thus, there is tremendous 
concern for the behavior of hospitals, particularly the 
forprofits as they attempt to recover costs and generate 
profits. The amount of bad debts expressed as a revenue 
deduction (percentage ) will be examined here to 
understand hospital behavior among nonprofit, 
government, and forprofits. 
Manhours Per Patient Day [HOUR - Hypothesis B4J. 
Human resources utilized in hospitals vary but because 
there are limitations on practice of nurses <the largest 
member of the hospital workforce> through the Nurse 
Practice Act, inspection and reviews by the Department 
of Health and Rehabilitative Services <HRS> ensure and 
safeguard patient safety, and compliance with 
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accreditation standards of the Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Hospitals <JCAH>, hospitals are not at 
a liberty to hire the cheapest and the least number of 
personnel. Forprofit hospitals have been theorized to 
minimize costs to ensure profits. It has been supposed 
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that there are incentives in the forprofit hospitals for 
its decision-makers/managers to ensure decreased cost 
because of potential rewards in the form of profit-sharing, 
salary increases, or promotions. This incentive of 
immediate wealth effects in the forprofit institution 
has been pointed out in earlier literature <Alchian, 
1969>. To the contrary, there is no immediate wealth 
effect in the nonprofit hospital because of the 
constraints on rights to residual <Clarkson, 1972>. 
The attempt to decrease cost is approached in terms 
of manpower and salaries since the hospital industry is 
labor-intensive. It can be argued that the forprofit 
hospital will attempt to decrease cost associated with 
manpower to a point where they are in compliance with 
the appropriate agencies and where the quality of care 
does not jeopardize patient safety. Unusually high 
death rates has been used as a broad indicator. In this 
study, Death Rates per DRG will be examined later. 
The nonprofit and government hospitals may not 
make profit but theoretically would have to ensure that 
costs and expenditures do not exceed revenues <Davis, 
1972>. Thus, the number o~ manhours per patient day in 
nonprofit and government hospitals may reflect expansion 
of services subject to budgetary constraints. In 
theory, we said that this expectation is a natural 
extension of increasing output to maximize bene~its to 
society. 
Salaries per FTE [SAL - Hypothesis B5J. Since 
providing health care is labor intensive, nurses and 
allied health staff are necessary on a 24-hour basis, 
seven days a week. Limiting types of services would be 
an indirect way of decreasing labor requirements up to 
the point where quality of care ensures patient safety 
and meets accepted standards. In this study, we control 
for this by population selection, as well as statistical 
controls by using bed size as a covariate in statistical 
analysis. The analyses on the top twenty DRGs compares 
hospitals on similar products <types of patients> using 
charges per DRG as a measure of costs incurred by the 
hospital. 
The forprofit hospitals may limit total number of 
employees <Manhaur• p•r Pati•nt Day>, but offer higher 
salaries. Higher salaries may be indicative of 
distribution of residual profits. While the nonprofit 
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hospital would not have similar incentives to curtail 
human resources, the argument has been posed that these 
hospitals· fiduciary motive is to ensure quality. 
Arguably, one can say that quantity of manpower does not 
necessarily mean quality. Also, there are JCAH and HRS 
standards which must be met by all hospitals regardless 
of ownership status. At a certain level, forprofit, 
nonprofit, and government hospitals would provide the 
quality of health services which does not reflect 
negatively towards the hospital < as indicated by D•ath 
Rate• per DRG >. It has been alluded to earlier that 
there are economic incentives in the forprofit sector 
such as profit-sharing or bonuses, these tied to the 
property rights argument for ownership rights to 
residual. Thus, higher salaries may be used as an 
indicator of distribution of profits. 
In the nonprofit and government hospitals, salary 
rates and position controls are subject to budget 
limits. The property rights theory would lead us to 
suspect that salaries in nonprofit and government 
hospitals would be lower than the forprofit hospitals 
because of this constraint in budget. 
Length of Stay [STAY -Hypothesis B6J, Charges 
CCHARG - Hypothesis 87]~ Reimbursements CREIM 
Hypothesis 88] on the top twenty DRGs common to all 
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hospitals. Nonprofit and government hospitals by virtue 
of being larger in bed size, thus having more services 
than their forprofit counterpart, may be able to offer 
needed services to more patients. Arguably, one can say 
that restricting services to specific patient 
populations would be a deliberate way on the part of 
forprofits to ensure profitability Cthey may not offer 
obstetrical or nursery services, etc.> by offering only 
those services where they could recoup costs and get the 
most reimbursements. This may indeed be plausible given 
the Diagnosis Related Groupings CDRGs>. 
With the agreed upon social arrangements using an 
output maximization rationale, it can be expected that 
nonprofit and government hospitals would serve indigents 
<Medicaid patients) and the elderly <Medicare patients>, 
regardless of the type of illness and ensure that 
quality of care meets accepted standards. This has been 
a justification for their existence: that certain 
health care needs are addressed. Additionally, purposes 
which advance public interest such as education and 
research have been mentioned. In this line of thinking, 
it has been a common perception that nonprofit and 
government hospitals provide care to patients whose 
illnesses are mare severe. Therefore, their patients 
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tend to stay longer and their occupancy rates remain 
high>; that they are located in areas that are in 
greatest need; because greater demands for health care 
exist they would have a greater number of beds. As a 
function of size <being larger>, they would have 
sufficient numbers of patients and provide a variety of 
services to allow for affiliation with university 
medical or nursing schools. It has been contended that 
a patient's stay may be longer in these hospitals by 
virtue of illness severity or to allow for clinical 
teaching-learning process to occur for residents, 
interns, and student nurses. Thus, the average length 
of stay per DRG is compared among nonprofit, government, 
and forprofit hospitals. 
Charges made by each hospital per DRG will be 
compared. There are problems in using charges as an 
indicator of actual costs. Many financial analysts will 
contend that charges made by hospitals do not reflect 
actual costs incurred. In the case of the forprofits, 
it is assumed that their numbers are padded to recover 
costs, bad debts, or uncompensated care, or to generate 
profits. If this is true, then this might be reflected 
in the higher charges pe~ DRG in the forprofit 
hospitals. 
Forprofit hospitals do not ~eceive tax deductible 
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donations and must pay income and property taxes. Does 
this mean that patient charges in forprofit hospitals 
would be higher because these costs are passed on to the 
recipients of care? Alternatively, would patient 
charges be lower in the nonprofit and government 
hospitals since they receive tax exemptions, 
philantropic donations and grants? In the business 
world, one has to remain price competitive (assuming 
consumers have knowledge about price differences). It 
has been posed that forprofit hospitals treat 
nonprofit/government prices as the ceiling. 
Therefore, all three hospital types could have similar 
patient charges <per DRG). 
Charges per DRG would reflect at least 30% of true 
costs in the delivery of care ( Note: This is a 
commonly accepted standard in the hospital industry.>. 
With DRGs, even if a hospital tried to price its 
services high, reimbursements remain fixed. Because of 
the phase-in period aver three years for DRG-based 
reimbursements, patient charges per ORG remains an 
important variable to consider. 
The amount reimbursed to the hospital 1s fixed 
according to the patient's discharge diagnosis. The 
creativity by which hospitals may maneuver to generate 
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revenue reflects its ability to adjust its patient 
operations in the most cost-effective manner. The 
hospital which operates under DRSs could react in such a 
way that patients are properly classified in DRGs that 
will allow them to be reimbursed the most. Property 
rights theory will predict that forprofit hospitals will 
most likely behave in this manner. 
Thus, we will examine the variables indicating 
efficiency: occupancy rates, ancillary expenses, bad 
debts, manhours per patient day, salaries per FTE, 
length of stay per DRG, charges per DRG, and 
reimbursements per DRG. Property right arrangements and 
ownership status have been related to the variables 
identified in the context of efficiency. The hypotheses 
will be tested as stated previously. As we uncover 
differences, further analyses on the direction of these 
differences and their significance will be done. 
Equity Variabl•• 
Medicare [CARE - Hypothesis ClJ, Medicaid [CAID 
Hypothesis C2J, and Uncompensated Care [UNCOM-
Hypothesis C3J. 
tested: 
The following hypotheses will be 
C-Ho: There are no differences among nonprofit, 
government, and forprafit hospitals in the number of 
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Medicare days [ClHol, Medicaid days [C2HoJ, and 
Uncompensated Care [C3Hol. 
C-Hl: There are differences among nonprofit, 
government, and ~orprofit hospitals in the number of 
Medicare days [C1H1J, Medicaid days [C2H1l, and 
Uncompensated Care [C3H1J. 
One philosophy of health care is that it is a 
right. Health care can be viewed in the class of basic 
liberties. John Rawls <1967> delineated two basic 
principles of justice: <1> that each person has an 
equal right to the most extensive total system of equal 
basic liberties; and <2> that social and economic 
inequities are to be arranged so that they are to the 
greatest benefit of the least advantaged. Assuming that 
the availability of health services is associated with 
better health, society should attempt to achieve an 
equality in the distribution of health services or an 
equality in physical, mental, and social well-being. 
Rawls <1971> has alluded to the satisfaction of the two 
principles of justice in a constitutional democracy 
through a government that regulates a ~ree economy. In 
an economic orientation, the goals would be full 
employment, competition, price stability, and growth 
measured in terms of dollars. Health policy, along the 
same lines, will identify what is the socially 
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acceptable health status of the citizens. In regulating 
health, the government attempts to control casts while 
improving quality and ensuring access. 
The assumed role of the nonprofit and government 
hospital is to further public purpose (i. e. provision 
of care to the society's underprivileged--aged and poor 
reflected in the number of Medicare and Medicaid 
patients cared for). Attached to the tax exemption 
status is the necessity of fulfilling its charitable 
goals. As a consequence, nonprofit and government 
hospitals are seen as output maximizers. Property 
rights theory leads us to suspect that the nonprofit and 
government hospitals should have greater numbers of 
Medicare and Medicaid patients as compared to forprofit 
hospitals. 
Uncompensated Care. One could suppose that 
nonprofit and government hospitals noH have the 
increased burden of caring for the elderly and indigent 
patients (assuming forprofits decrease production of 
services to Medicare and Medicaid patients 
particularly because Medicare patients are reimbursed 
under DRG limitations and Medicaid patients are sicker, 
requiring more resources>. The casts of uncompensated 
care in the nonprofit and government hospitals 
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might be different in comparison to their forprofit 
counterpart. There may be limited care provided to 
those for whom financing is nat available or by limiting 
the care provided to those for ~hom limits have been set 
on reimbursement. 
The hypotheses have been stated preceding the 
thoughts we have regarding expected relationships of 
hospital behavior, given the implications of the 
property rights theory. Possibly, nonprofit and 
government hospitals are expected to provide for 
Medicare and Medicaid patients. However, because 
government monies are available for these patients, it 
would be logical to suppose that forprofit hospitals 
would see this as a market for certain services if 
reimbursed monies meet costs with an acceptable profit 
margin. All three hospital types are subject to 
HRS/JCAH certification, potential threats of malpractice 
suits, and moral-ethical obligations to preserve life, 
maintain health, and alleviate suffering. All must 
maintain patient safety and meet accepted standards of 
patient care. Previous literature cited alluded to the 
concept of nonprofit hospitals as output maximizers 
(Long, 1964; Klarman, 1965; Newhouse, 1970). As we 
examine the number of Medicare and Medicaid days in the 
three types of hospitals, the percentages of bad debts 
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and uncompensated care, we take special note that 
further analyses may be needed upon uncovering 
significant differences. 
Quality of C•r• 
Death Rates Per DRG [Hypothesis-D). There is a 
concern for quality of care delivered as emphasis on 
generating profits and decreasing costs are made and the 
role of the forprofit sector in the provision of 
services. The following hypothesis will be tested: 
D-lHo: There are no differences among nonprofit, 
government, and forprofit hospitals on death rates per 
DRG. 
D-1H1: There are differences among nonprofit, 
government, and forprofit hospitals on death rates per 
DRG. 
The difficulty in this study is that various 
hospitals do not necessarily offer the exact same 
services. Service differences are further complicated 
by differences in the clientele who avail themselves of 
these products. The concepts relevant to the assessment 
of the quality of in-patient care in the hospital 
setting are discussed to justify the methodology 
appropriate far its evaluation. 
Health care evaluation is complicated by the fact 
69 
that "quality .. is not easy to define much mere 
quantified and measured. The importance of evaluating 
quality of care is repeatedly underscored when issues on 
pricing, access and availability are discussed. It 
becomes further clouded when quality is not 
operationally defined. Issues of quality and how it is 
defined is of initial importance prior to evaluation. 
Payne <1967> defined quality of care as that level 
of excellence produced and documented in the process of 
diagnosis and therapy based on the best knowledge 
derived from science and the humanities, and which 
results in the least morbidity and mortality rates. 
Quality consists of the 11 goodness 11 or 11 badness" with 
respect to this dimension. He cautions that there is a 
multitude of possible dimensions and criteria which when 
used to define quality will have a profound influence on 
the approaches and methods one may employ in the 
assessment of medical care. DeGendt <1970) defined 
quality as the degree of conformity to preset standards 
and deals exlusively with patient care as contrasted to 
medical care or health care. Brook (1973) points out 
that the phrase quality of care is vague and has 
numerous emotional overlays but delineated that concern 
should be on those measures of health components which 
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can be altered by the medical care process and are 
considered indicators of quality of care. 
The issue in providing care to the client 
Cpatient) in addition to cost is quality. Members of 
the medical and nursing professions have been trained 
with respect to the humanitarian ideals of providing the 
best possible care without regard for cost. With 
decreasing government subsidies to health care, clearly 
the health care providers are underfire to provide 
e+fective care ~ith limitations on cost. The problem of 
accountability far the actions of health care 
professionals is quite vague and fragmented. Both 
medicine and nursing practitioners are subject to state 
licensure laws. However, they do not have direct 
accountability, to the public for their actions and 
performance unlike our elected officials who are subject 
to public scrutiny. Hospitals, while subject to 
numerous federal and state controls, also do not have 
direct accountability to the public. 
Assessing the quality of care given is difficult. 
Ideally it should include a study of inputs, processes, 
and outcomes in the provision of health care. 
Heydebrand (1973> and Georgopoulos (1962) have studied 
the relation of hospital structure to hospital 
performance. Thus, the relation of inputs to the 
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outcome. Organizational inputs include resources --
physical, financial, and human <physicians, nurses, and 
allied health employees). The relationship of resource 
utilization to hospital performance has been the subject 
of numerous economic studies of Feldstein <1971>, 
Newhouse <1970>, Pauly~ Redisch <1973>, and Berry 
(1973). Efficiency issues are addressed in terms of 
costs incurred providing services. Hospital 
effectiveness of care delivered is reflected in the 
quality of the outcomes. Starfield <1973) identified 
five organizational variables which facilitate the 
patient care outcomes in the hospital. These are 
personnel, facilities and equipment, the arganization·s 
leadership - politics - planning - goals -control 
consumer involvement, information, and finance. 
Donabedian (1966, 1968) notes the complexity of 
evaluating the quality of medical care and that issues 
such as availability of care (access and 
appropriateness>; prevention; patient-physician 
relationship; client and provider satisfaction are 
crucial. He pointed out that quality measurement must 
include structural, procedural, and outcome components. 
The strengths and weaknesses of these are identified by 
Griffith (1978>. Structural measures tend to advocate 
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high quality but not guarantee it. Procedural measures 
Outcome measures are highly technical and specific. 
look at the end paint; the di~~iculty lies in relating 
specific events to the outcome. 
The view of hospitals as complex systems with 
defined, explicit purposes comes from the social science 
perspectives of Etzioni <1961), Blau and Scott <1962>, 
and Perrow (1965). The relationships of various 
organization structures, attributes, or goals to 
determining organizational efTectiveness, or the 
quality of care have been studied in one form or another 
by numerous researchers. Shortell and Brown (1976> 
reviewed 19 comparative empirical studies of hospitals 
and classified these organizational variables into six 
major categories. These are: the environment, goals, 
technology, decision-making structure, reward system, 
and modes of coordination. 
Moseley and Grimes (1976> presented an analytical 
framework to measure the hospital effectiveness. There 
were two broad measures: ( 1 ) 
(2) administrative measures. 
patient care measures and 
Under these were 
structural, process, outcome, and attitudinal measures. 
At best, outcome measures of quality of care are 
the most important indicators. Diagnostic specific 
mortality and morbidity rates have been useTul in 
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determining needs for specific services. When used in 
comparative studies, this is useful in determining 
effectiveness of different treatments. While this can 
be done, an important consideration is how severe an 
illness suffered is and how the quality of life is a~ter 
discharge, if death did not occur. Morbidity and 
mortality statistics are helpful and continue to be an 
important element of medical care appraisal. 
To measure quality, the indicator used for purposes 
of this study will be DRG specific death rates expressed 
as a percentage of deaths over one year statistically 
controlling for the number of discharges per DRG 
category. In the literature review, we mention the 
conspicuous production theory of the nonprofit firm 
<Lin, 1971) which models the hospital with decision 
makers who are driven by prestige and work towards 
transforming their organization into its 11 desired status 
(prestigious>." Newhouse (1970) reiterated a similar 
argument but extended this to include quality and 
quantity. In our model here, death rates per DRG is 
used as a criterion to indicate that level of quality 
that all hospitals meet. Regardless of ownership 
status, all hospitals are under regulatory constraints, 
fear of malpractice suits, and have the potential threat 
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to the hospital~s reputation or status. 
As presented in the preceding pages, the framework 
for this analysis include institutional variables such 
as bed size and location. Ef~iciency variables are 
measured in terms of occupancy rates, ancillary 
expenses, bad debts, manhours per patient day, salaries 
per FTE, average length of stay per DRS, charges per 
DRG, and reimbursements per DRS. As measures of equity, 
the number of Medicare and Medicaid patients days will 
be examined; also, the amount of uncompensated care 
expenditures will be included in the analysis. As an 
indicator of quality, death rates per DRG among 
nonprofit, government, and forprofit hospitals are 
compared. 
The succeeding chapter will describe the methods 
used for this study. It describes the selection of the 
population, data management, and data analysis. 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
In the preceding chapter, the framework for 
analysis was described and several hypotheses were 
stated. The study population, data management, and 
statistical methods for analysis will be described in 
the following pages. 
Study Population. In selecting the study setting~ 
there were numerous limitations related to logistics as 
well as our present knowledge of the hospital setting. 
The State of Florida is one of the sun-belt regions 
where growth of both nonprofit and forprofit hospitals 
has been observed. Most notablyy Florida has 44% of 
forprofit hospitals as a percentage of nonfederal short-
term general hospitals, second only to the State of 
Nevada with SO% <AHA, 1984; FAH, 1984). The 
attractiveness of Florida to retirees means that 
enrollees in Medicare will be substantial. This is 
important because DRG reimbursement rules apply to 
Medicare patients. Our analysis on the top twenty DRGs 
apply to Medicare patients only. Thus, a study setting 
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in this area is appropriate. As of July, 1983 there 
were over 1.5 million persons enrolled in Medicare 
<Florida Statistical Abstract 1985>. There is a clear 
preference by forprofit hospitals for areas such as 
Florida. Preferred locations are those noted to be with 
greatest increases in per capita income and population 
and widespread insurance coverage <Mullner and Hadley, 
1984>. Same of these considerations make Florida ideal 
as the setting for this study. 
The area of South Florida with three counties [Palm 
Beach, Broward, and Dade] is selected because of the 
availability of data for the variables under 
investigation. With 35% of hospitals with over 100 
beds, offering acute, general care located in South 
Florida, the advantages of using the existing data set 
far outweighed extending the sampling throughout the 
State <considering the unavailability of data for other 
areas>. 
In South Florida, there are over half a million 
Medicare enrollees. There are 140,608 in Palm Beach, 
212~293 in Broward, and 226,625 in Dade CFSA, 1986>. 
This is important for this study since one focus of the 
analysis deals with the issue of equity measured in 
terms of the number of Medicare days, Medicaid days, and 
amounts of Uncompensated care. Considering this, let us 
look at the economic status in these areas. The median 
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family income for Palm Beach for a family of two is 
$16,665, and for a family of three, $19,817. The 
percentage of families with incomes belo~ the poverty 
level is 6.7. In Broward, the income for a family of 
two was $16,580 and $19,592 for a family of three. The 
percentage of families ~ith incomes below poverty level 
was 6.3. In Dade, with incomes of $15,571 for a family 
of two and $18,642, the percentage of families with 
incomes below the poverty level was highest of the three 
counties at 11.9 <FSA, 1985>. 
The hospitals in the three counties which will be 
selected shall be those which offer acute care, general 
services with at least 100 beds. It was explained 
earlier that smaller bed size may account for certain 
services not being offered by a hospital. By virtue of 
the size, resource requirements would vary also. 
Therefore, population selection using a minimum bed size 
as a criterion is important. Fifty-six hospitals in 
south Florida met the preceding criteria. 
Data Management. The data were obtained from the 
Hospital Cost Containment Board <HCCB> and the 
Professional Review Organization <PRO>. Since the DRG-
based reimbursement provision of the Tefra Act was 
signed in 1982, there was a three-year phase in period 
for all hospitals. Hospitals ended their fiscal years 
differently, hence each hospital had a different base 
78 
year. To ensure hospitals were at least one year under 
DRG-based reimbursement, 1984 data were obtained. The 
ideal study would track results over the entire phase-in 
period. However, data processing takes time. Medicare 
billing claims have not been completely processed and 
can not be made available for this study by the PRO. 
These PRO data were submitted by the hospitals to a 
Fiscal Intermediary who processed the claims. The 
Intermediary then provided the PRO with the electronic 
copy of the processed claim. The data passed through 
numerous edits and were in excess of 98X correct. The 
data for the following variables were derived from this 
report: average length of stay per DRG, average patient 
charges per DRG, average hospital reimbursement per DRG, 
and percent of death rates per DRG. The data from the 
Hospital Cost Containment Board were compiled from each 
hospital budget submitted to the Board for approval. 
These budgets are compiled annually and reports are 
published by the Board which are available for public 
information. Copies of the budgets were purchased from 
the Board. Data for specific variables under study were 
derived from these reports <Occupancy Rates, Ancillary 
Expenses, Bad Debts, Manhours per Patient Day, Salaries 
per FTE, Medicare, Medicaid, Uncompensated Care>. 
Data Analysis. The primary method for analyses of 
data is analysis of va~iance using the Statistical 
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Package for the Social Sciences <SPSS>. This program 
was run via Xerox mainframe computers at the Computer 
Services Division of the Miami Heart Institute. Because 
of limitations inherent in the computer hardware~ the 
two data sets (1) 1984 PRO DRG data and <2> 1984 HCCB 
Budget data were entered under separate files. 
The coding scheme utilized for hospitals by 
ownership was derived from the grouping system by the 
HCCB: 
HCCB CODE DEFINITION 
3a 1 church-operated, nonprofit 
3b 2 other, nonprofit 
3c 3 individual, forprofit 
3d 4 partnership, forprofit 
3e 5 corporation, forprofit 
3f 6 federal government 
3g 7 city government 
3h 8 hospital district authority 
3i 9 state 
3j 10 city-county 
3k 11 county 
For comparisons by ownership status, hospitals were 
grouped as nonprofit (1, 2>, government <8, 10, 11>, and 
forprofit <4, 5) hospitals. No hospitals in the sample 
belonged to categories 3, 6, 7, and 9. 
For comparisons by location, each hospital was 
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categorized according to its geographic area based on 
the standard Metropolitan Statistical Area CMSA>. The 
following scheme was used for coding purposes: 
10 = Palm Beach County 
20 = Broward County 
30 = Dade County 
The statistical methods employed to analyze the 
data include the following: 
C1> Descriptive Statistics were obtained by using 
subprogram Condescriptive, Frequencies, and Breakdown. 
<2> The three hospital ownership types were 
compared on the Institutional Variables using one-way 
analysis of variance. 
[ BEDS J 
[ LOC J 
by 
by 
[ NONPROFIT, GOVERNMENT, FORPROFIT J 
[ NONPROFIT, GOVERNMENT, FORPROFIT J 
(3) If necessary, dependent variables are compared 
on paired hospital ownership types, i. e. nonprofit vs. 
forprofit or forprofit vs. government. 
For the analyses, involving the Efficiency 
Variables, the following ANOVA model was used for the 
hospital budget data comparisons: 
[ DCC, ANCI, DEBT, HOUR, SAL J BY 
[ NONPROFIT, GOVERNMENT, FDRPROFIT J WITH 
[ BEDS, LOCJ 
For the DRG data analysis of the top twenty DRGs, 
each DRG category was analyzed using the following 
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model: 
[ STAY, CHARGES, REIM PER DRS ] BY 
[ NONPROFIT, GOVERNMENT, FORPROFIT ] WITH 
[ DISCHARGES l 
For the analyses, involving the equity variables, 
the follo~ing ANOVA model was used for the hospital 
budget data comparisons: 
[ CARE, CAID, UNCOMP l BY 
[ NONPROFIT, GOVERNMENT, FORPROFIT l WITH 
[ BEDS, LOC J 
For the quality variable, analysis was done using 
the following model: 
( DEATH RATES PER DRG ] BY 
[ NONPROFIT, GOVERNMENT, FORPROFIT J WITH 
[ DISCHARGES J 
The fit of the model using bed size was judged 
better than the model using occupancy rates based on 
trial statistical analyses made using ANOVA, and later 
analysis of covariance. R squares and ETAs were 
compared. In general, R-squares with [ BEDS] rather 
than [ DCC ] as a covariate were higher. The tables 
report the F-scores for the ANOVA runs with [ BEDS J and 
[ LOC J as a covariate. Paired tests [ i. e. NP vs FP, 
etc ] used ( BEDS J only as a covariate. 
Using Options 7 and 10 of SPSS ANDVA, the effect of 
covariates was assessed concurrently with the factors. 
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This option allows to remove <statistically) extraneous 
variation in the dependent variable that is attributable 
to covariates included in the model. This increases 
measurement precision. In this case, the decomposition 
of explained variance in the dependent variable would be 
quite similar to a regression analysis involving both 
metric and dummy variables as predictors. Each printout 
was examined in terms of main effects and the 
contribution of each factor to the overall significance 
of differences. Because the model used here is 
essentially a factorial design with unequal cell 
frequencies, the component sums of squares do not add up 
to the total sums of squares since the main effects and 
the interaction effects are not independent. Thus, even 
if the F-value for the additive model is significant, 
one or more of the factors may or may not be 
significant. Therefore, each F-value is examined for 
significance and the F-value for the specific factor 
<not the additive main effects> is reported in all the 
tables throughout the text. For interactions, 
covariate by factor analyses were processed. [ Note: 
Factors are the nonmetric categorical variable i. e. 
ownership status of hospitals: nonprofit, government, 
forprofit. Covariates are used to designate a metric 
independent variable i. e. number of beds or number of 
discharges. ] Hospital budget data analyses showed 
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significant interaction e~~ects. Consequently, multiple 
classification analyses become meaningless <Andrews, 
1973; Nie, et. al., 1975). For analyses which do not 
show signi~icant interaction effects, the deviations 
from the mean adjusted for independents a~d covariates 
are reported to clarify the direct1~n <positive or 
negative deviation from ~~e grand mean) of differences 
among nonpro{'t, government, and forprofit hospitals. 
Obtaining the data for all variables for different 
hospitals falling under specific ownership categories 
was limited to the South Florida area. Because the 
sample is small, statistical validity concerns arise. 
As 1n the case of this study, the criteria for hospital 
selection i. e. acute care only with 100 beds and over 
brought us fifty-six hospitals. Three ownership 
categories resulted to unequal cell sizes which 
complicate the use of ANOVA. 
There are problems regarding the potential 
violation of the ANOVA assumptions such as normality of 
distribution and homogeneity of variance. To address 
this, nonparametric tests of significance were done on 
the budget data set using Mann-Whitney. The computation 
of the test statistic can be described as fallows: The 
two samples are combined and assigned a rank +rom 
smallest to largest. The sum of ranks from the first 
population is obtained. If the location parameter of 
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population 1 is smaller than the location parameter of 
population 2, we expect the sum of the ranks for 
population 1 to be smaller than the sum of the ranks for 
papulation ~ -~, or VIce versa. The test statistic is 
based on the rationale that depending on the null 
hypothesis, either a sufficiently small or a 
sufficiently large sum of ranks assigned to sample 
observations from population 1 causes us to reject the 
null hypothesis <Daniel, 1978>. 
The significance level of the results of Mann-
Whitney tests are reported far each table comparing 
pairs of hospitals. It is important to note that Mann-
Whitney analyses does not allow us to control far bed 
size or location. Thus, tables an paired tests report 
both ANOVA and Mann-Whitney results. In addition, one 
government hospital outlier was dropped in separate 
analyses. These results are indicated as well. 
Other appropriate tests of significance were also 
used where appropriate, such as Chi-square for the 
analyses on distribution of hospitals by location. 
Multiple regression analyses with and without dummy 
variables were used in certain instances. 
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
This chapter presents the study results follo~ing 
the framework for analysis presented in Chapter III. 
In•titutional Variabl•• 
Fifty-six hospitals met the criteria for inclusion 
in the study with reference to types of service offered. 
These hospitals offered acute care, general services and 
all have current licenses required by governmental 
authorities having jurisdiction. The study population 
are subcategorized into nonprofit (21 hospitals: 1 
church-operated, 20 non-church operated>, government (8 
hospitals~ 1 county, 7 hospital district authority>, 
and forprofit ( 27 hospitals: 2 partnership, 25 
corporation o~ned>. According to location, 18 percent 
of hospitals are located in Palm Beach; 32 percent in 
Broward; and 50 percent in Dade County. 
Two hypotheses were advanced in Chapter III 
regarding bed size [All, and location [A2J. We test 
these twa hypotheses using analysis of variance. 
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Bed Size [ Hypothesis All. Table I shows that 
government hospitals have the highest mean bed size of 
TABLE I I BED CAPACITY BV OWNERSHIP 
OWNERSHIP MEANS F-SCORE BIB. R2 
NONPROFIT 338 
GOVERNMENT 4SO 
FORPROFIT 246 
BRAND MEAN 310 4.21 .02 .14 
450 and forprofit hospitals with the least at 246. The 
differences were statistically significant at < .OS. 
Comparing the forprofit hospitals and the 
nonprofit hospitals only ( Mean = 286; F = 5.91; Sig. = 
.01 J, the results show that differences were 
statistically significant. In comparing nonprofit 
hospitals and government hospitals, the results show no 
statistical significance ( Mean = 369; F = 1.34; Sig. = 
NS l. 
As cited previously, a study of 1985 data for 160 
Florida hospitals, forprofit hospitals are significantly 
smaller <Sorrentino, 1985>. This is consistent with the 
analysis of the 56 South Florida hospitals. Forprofits 
by virtue of their smaller size, thus, would have 
different resource requirements -- probably less if the 
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property rights view 1s true. This further justifies 
the need to control for bed size in data analysis. 
Location [Hypothesis A2J. The tabulation on 
hospital location is shown in Table II. 
TABLE I I 1 CROSSTABULATION BY OWNERSHIP BY LOCATION 
OWNERSHIP PALM BEACH BROWARD DADE 
NONPROFIT 4 2 1~ 
GOVERNMENT 3 4 1 
FORPROFIT 3 12 12 
PERCENT 17.96 32.14 so.oo 
Note the distribution of hospitals in the three 
counties by ownership status according to location. 
Dade County has the largest share of hospitals at 50%, 
followed by Broward at 32/.. Differences in bed 
capacity by location were insignificant with the mean 
bed size in Palm Beach at 232, 
Dade at 337 ( See Table III >. 
Broward at 310, and 
To test A2, analysis of variance showed the 
relationship of bed size by ownership status to location 
as significantly different at less than .05 <F=4.04; r-
square = .24>, nate Table IV • Further analyzing the 
relationship, to test for differences in the number of 
hospitals by ownership type in the three geographic 
areas, chi-square test was done. The results of chi-
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TABLE III I BED CAPACITY BY LOCATION 
LOCATION MEANS F-SCORE SIB. R2 
PALM BEACH 232 
BROWARD 310 
DADE 337 
GRAND MEAN 310 1.oe NB • 04 
TABLE IV1 BED CAPACITY BY OWNERSHIP BY LOCATION 
OWNERSHIP MEANS F-SCDRE BIG. R2 
NONPROFIT 338 
GOVERNMENT 4~0 
FORPROFIT 246 
GRAND MEAN 310 4.04 <.O~ .24 
square at 12.85 was significant at .01. 
In Dade, there is a majority of nonprofit 
hospitals. Both Dade and Bro~ard have higher over age 
65 population enrolled in Medicare (227,729 for Dade and 
215,873 for Broward; 147,242 for Palm Beach>. Income 
levels for both Dade and Broward counties are lower than 
Palm Beach ( For a family of 3 average income in Palm 
Beach is $19,817; Broward with $19,592: Dade with 
$18,642). Note that there are more forprofit hospitals 
in Dade and Broward than in Palm Beach, even if the 
ave~age income here is lo~er. It is important to 
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consider, though, that population density may play a 
role in location preferences. Government hospitals, 
though, are seen in greater proportion in Palm Beach and 
Broward counties. In both areas, fewer nonprofit 
hospitals exist in proportion to Dade County <There are 
12 nonpro~it hospitals in Dade as opposed to 10 in 
Broward and 4 in Palm Beach). To illustrate this, note 
that in 1985, Dade ranked third in Florida in terms of 
population density with 900 persons per square mile or 
15.59/. of the State population. Broward ranked second 
with a population density o~ 928 persons per square mile 
or 9.96% o~ the state population. Palm Beach ranked 
tenth in the state with 358 persons per square mile or 
6.32/. of the state population. Overall, hospital beds 
per person are highest in Dade County. The total beds 
per 100,000 persons are as follows: state = 456; Dade = 
550; Broward = 514; Palm Beach= 388 CFSA, 1986). 
Conclusion. The study findings showed that 
government and nonprofit hospitals have larger bed size 
than forprofits. Chapter II and III explained why bed 
size differs among hospital ownership types. 
Specifically, we alluded to the profit maximization 
behavior in the forprofit hospital by limiting resource 
requirements thru bed size limitations; the nonprofit 
and government hospital behavior point to output 
maximization. Property rights suggest output 
90 
maximization in the nonprofit and government hospital 
because o~ the social obligations attached to their tax 
exemption status. These expectations mean that these 
hospitals would maximize quantity of service. In order 
to render services, the hospitals must have enough beds. 
Therefore, we see the larger bed size in the nonprofit 
and government hospitals <See discussion on pp. 29-31; 
48-49). The evidence is consistent with the property 
rights argument. 
The analyses on location show evidence in support 
of the property rights view. Location preferences by 
forprofit hospitals depend on barriers to entry such as 
certificate of need requirements and potential 
profitability in certain geographic areas depending on 
market share, competition, demand and health insurance 
reimbursement rules. In this regard, occupancy rates 
indicate hospital utilization which reflects the 
behavior of the hospital and is discussed in the latter 
pages. Because this study was done in one homogeneous 
area, the potential confounding variable OT 
reimbursement rules is controlled for. Forprofit 
hospitals prefer to locate in areas where the hospital 
can project a reasonable census even during the summer 
months. The study results confirm this as shown in the 
papulation densities in Dade and Broward Counties and 
the preponderance of forprofit hospitals in these areas. 
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It should be pointed out that in this study, the 
hospital age has not been explored. This is an 
interesting variable to consider from an institutional 
standpoint because of its potential role in what types 
of hospitals are built in certain locations. 
Particularly with newer hospitals, the restriction on 
where to build and how much to build may depend on what 
types and number of hospitals are already present in a 
locale. 
Efficiency Variabl•• 
The tests for significance of differences were done 
following the model specified in Chapter IV. Bed size 
and location were used as covariates in the analyses for 
three categories. 
Occupancy Rates [Hypothesis BlJ. Table V shows 
TABLE VI OCCUPANCY RATES BY OWNERSHIP 
OWNERSHIP MEAN MEDIAN F-SCORE BIG. 
NONPROFIT 74.7 76.9 
GOVERNMENT 78.7 79.6 
FORPROFIT 66.6 6t'5.6 
GRAND MEAN 71.4 4.36 .01 
significant results. 
These findings are consistent with the findings for 
the entire state of Florida in 1985 (Sorrentino, 1985>. 
Both nonprofit and government hospitals show higher 
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occupancy rates. Further testing for differences, 
nonprofits were compared with forprofits. Significant 
differences were at the .05 level; note Table VI. 
TABLE VI1 OCCUPANCY RATES BY OWNERSHIP 
F-SCORE 
NP vs FP 4.88 
NP vs 9 .87 
FP vs B 
AN OVA 
SIG 
.os 
NB 
<.o~ 
M-W 
SIB 
.OS2 
Nonprofits have higher occupancy rates as compared to 
forprofit hospitals by 8.1%. An implication cited 
earlier in this framework was that government hospitals 
and nonprofit hospitals may attempt to expand units of 
service, i.e. output maximization. When nonprofits were 
compared to government hospitals, no significant 
difference was found <F = .87). However, government 
hospitals had higher occupancy rates than nonprofits by 
4/.. Forprofit hospital occupancy rates were lower in 
relation to the government hospital by 12.1/.. 
Nate the differences when examining median values. 
Testing these differences using Mann-Whitney analyses 
show that nonprofits compared to forprofits are not 
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significantly different at the .05 level. Eliminating 
one government hospital outlier, forprofit hospitals 
compared to government hospitals did not show 
significant dif~erences at the .05 level. Thus, using 
this sample in South Florida, we fail to find support 
for the property rights theory. 
The forprofit hospital has been proposed to ensure 
profitability in two ways: ( 1 ) increase occupancy 
rates, and (2) reduce staffing levels and other 
associated expenses. The forprofit hospitals, on a 
national average consistently run lower occupancy rates 
<AHA, 1984>. According to HCCB data on occupancy rates 
for all hospital types, occupancy rates are down 
6.7/. in the state as of the last half of 1985 <HCCB, 
1985>. Nonprofit and government hospitals showed 
significantly higher occupancy rates than forprofit 
hospitals <Sorrentino, 1985). This trend can be viewed 
as a product of increasing competition among hospitals 
rather than a failure on the part of forprofit hospitals 
to maximize utilization of hospital beds. 
There is movement towards greater market 
competition among individual facilities within various 
areas. In Florida, the difficulty in examining inter-
hospital competition vis-a-vis ownership type 
differences is complicated by the effect of population 
size an natural monopoly. In 1980, only seven of the 
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nineteen Metropolitan Statistical Areas CMSAs> in 
Florida C36.3'l.> continued to have 50'l. or more of all 
patient days delivered by a single institution. All 
nineteen MSAs, except for Tallahassee and Fort Walton 
Beach, showed declines in market shares. Miami, St. 
Petersburg, and Fort Lauderdale all showed declines in 
the market share of the top four hospitals <FSA, 1986>. 
These changes in hospital market structure are re~lected 
in hospital ownership in the State; note Table VII. 
TABLE VII• STATE OF FLORIDA BEDS PATIENT DAVB 
AND HOSPITAL TYPE 
NONPROFIT GOVERNMENT FCRPROFIT 
1970 31.9X 12.BX 
1980 48.8 20.3 30.9 
PCT. CHANGE -6.~ -11.6 18.1 
1970 ~7.7 33.~ e.e 
1980 18.6 
PCT. CHANGE -2.2 -14.9 17.1 
1970 48.7 27.9 23.4 
1980 42.~ 17.1 40.3 
PCT. CHANGE -6.2 -10.8 16.9 
In 1980, the market share of forprofit hospitals 
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was doubled (from 23.4X in 1970 to 40.3X in 1980>. This 
re~lects a 16.9f. increase in a decade. Their share of 
beds grew by 141/. and patient days by 194X. The 
nonprofit and government hospitals lost market shares in 
all categories between 1970 and 1980. The proportion of 
government hospitals decreased by 10.87., their market 
share of beds by 11.6/., and the total patient days 
declined by 14.9/.. The nonprofit hospitals showed 
declines as well. So, when one looks at occupancy rate 
statistics, even if occupancy rates were higher in 
nonprofit and government institutions, despite 
controlling for bed size and location, it is important 
to consider the effect of increased competition. 
We need to consider the fact that even though 
forprofit hospitals have lower occupancy rates, it is 
possible that the types of patients occupying forprofit 
beds differ. A profit seeking hospital might prefer to 
have lower occupancy rates providing that services are 
reimbursed through private insurance or by the patients 
themselves paying aut-of-pocket. Therefore, when 
examining occupancy rates, it is wise to investigate the 
differences in types of insurance payers, i. e. patients 
occupying beds who are Medicare recipients and under DRG 
reimbursements or patients who do not have the means to 
pay. The number of Medicare and Medicaid days will be 
examined later. In addition to this, the amount of bad 
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debts incurred by the hospital is examined with the 
thought that caring for patients who do not have the 
means to pay might cause the hospital to have higher bad 
debts. 
Ancillary Expenses [Hypothesis B2J. Note Table 
VIII. Differences were significant at less than .01. 
TABLE VIIIa ANCILLARY EXPENSES BY OWNERSHIP 
OWNERSHIP MEAN MEDIAN F-SCORE SIB. 
NONPROFIT 13.6 11.6 
GOVERNMENT 19.1 12.4 
FORPROFIT e.o 7.4 
BRAND MEAN 11.7 49.48 <.01 
Hospital ownership types were paired to test if 
differences were significant; note Table IX. 
TABLE IX1 ANCILLARY EXPENSES 
A NOVA A NOVA M-W 
F-SCORE BIG BIG 
NP v• a 16.67 <.01 NB CNS*> 
FP v• G ~3.34 <.01 NS CNS•> 
NP vs FP 38.56 <.01 .o~ 
Analysis of variance results comparing mean 
differences show significance at <.01. Comparing 
nonprofit and government hospitals only, the results 
shaw that nonprofit hospitals spent less than the 
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government hospitals ($5.5 mil.>. Comparing the 
farprofits to government hospitals, government hospitals 
spent more than ~arprofits by $11.1million. Comparing 
nonprofit hospitals to forprafit hospitals, forpro+its 
spent less by $5.6 million. 
Mann-Whitney results comparing medians show 
nonprofits with lower ancillary expenses than government 
hospitals by $.8 million; this is not significant. 
Forprofits compared to government hospitals were lower 
by $5.0 million; this is not statistically significant. 
Comparing nonpro~its to forprofits, forprofits were 
lower by $4.2 million; this is statistically significant 
at .05. 
This discrepancy in findings suggests that the 
distribution of ancillary expenses in government 
hospitals may not be normal. Also, bear in mind that 
Mann-Whitney analyses did not control ~or bed size and 
location. 
To examine further what might explain these 
di~ferences in ancillary expenses, attention should be 
given to the fact that ancillary expenses here are not 
broken down by disease category. At best it is a very 
gross measure. Let us analyze the relationship of this 
measure with several indicators in the study sample. 
Using multiple regression analysis, beds, the percentage 
of bad debts, uncompensated care~ the number of Medicare 
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days, and Medicaid days were used as predictors ~or 
ancillary services. The findings show R square at 91.2X 
with beds <<.001>, Medicare days <<.OS>, and Medicaid 
days <<.005) as statistically significant predictors. 
This finding is relevant in our analyses on hospital 
ownership. Clearly, this shows that bed size is a 
definite factor in determining ancillary service 
expenditures. We look into the possibility that the 
number of Medicare days and Medicaid days among three 
hospital types might contribute to the variation in 
ancillary expenses. Regression analysis is done with 
five predictors (nonprofit, government, bed size, 
Medicare days, and Medicaid days). No statistically 
significant difference was discerned on ownership 
categories. However, bed size, Medicare days, Medicaid 
days ( t-ratias 5.97, 1.96, 2.64 respectively ) were 
statistically significant predictors for ancillary 
expenses <R square= 91.3/.). We regress ancillary 
expenses on three predictors: bed size, nonprofit, and 
government hospitals (with forprofits used as a 
reference category). Our findings confirm beds as a 
statistically significant predictor with a t-ratio of 
19.77 <R square= 90/.). Nonprofit and government 
hospitals failed to show statistical significance. Note 
that in our earlier analysis we found higher occupancy 
rates in the government and nonprofit hospitals. 
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Regression analysis is done with three predictors 
(occupancy rates, nonprofit, and government>. We find 
that occupancy rates and government hospitals as 
statistically significant <t-ratios were 2.63 and 1.98 
respectively>. The R square is 2SX •• 
The findings we have show that variations in 
ancillary expenses can be attributed to variations in 
bedsize, occupancy rates, Medicare days, and Medicaid 
days. The Mann-Whitney analysis showed significantly 
higher ancillary expenses in the nonprofit hospitals as 
compared to the forprofit hospitals. However, 
multiple regression analysis failed to show 
statistically significant differences between 
nonprofit/government hospitals compared to the forprofit 
hospital. This analysis of ancillary expenses failed to 
show support of the property rights theory. 
Bad Debts (Hypothesis 83]. Table X below shows 
statistically significant differences at less than .01. 
Government hospitals have the highest percent of bad 
TABLE Xa 
OWNERSHIP 
NONPROFIT 
GOVERNMENT 
FORPROFIT 
GRAND MEAN 
BAD DEBTS BY OWNERSHIP 
MEAN 
3.79 
10.48 
3.91 
4.90 
MEDIAN F-SCORE SIB. 
16.07 <.01 
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debts. Table XI shows the paired analyses. Comparing 
nonprofit hospitals with government hospitals, note that 
bad debts in the government hospitals were significantly 
higher C6.70X>. Compared to forprofit hospitals, 
forprofits have lower bad debts (-6.57'l.> than government 
hospitals. See Table XI below: 
TABLE XII BAD DEBTS 
ANOVA ANOVA M-W 
F-SCORE BIB. SIS. 
NP v• a 17.4S <.01 <.01 ((.01*) 
FP vs G 24.68 <.01 <.01 C<. Ol•> 
NP v• FP .os NS NB 
There appears to be a similarity between the 
nonprofit and forprofit hospital. Comparing nonprofit 
hospitals to forprofit hospitals in terms of bad debts, 
the difference was not statistically significant. 
This lends support for hospital behavior along the lines 
of the recovery of cost or meeting budget constraints 
for the nonprofit sector, and profit maximization in the 
forprofit sector. This could also be a reflection of 
output maximization in the government hospital. The 
similarity between nonprofit and forprofit hospitals on 
bad debts may suggest that some factor other than 
property rights could explain the difference. Lower bad 
debts may imply internal operations which facilitate 
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processing of bills or the collection of unpaid ones. 
It could also mean that the patient clientele of the 
hospital are insured; therefore, bills are paid or they 
have patients who have the means to pay, and thus do not 
incur bad debts. Attempting to explore these 
possibilities, we regress bad debts on bed size, 
Medicare days, Medicaid days, and the percentage of 
uncompensated care. Our findings show that only 
uncompensated care was a statistically significant 
predictor <<.01). We will do further analysis on 
uncompensated care as an equity variable later. 
Manhours [Hypothesis B4J. Comparing all three 
hospital types controlling for bed size, differences 
were statistically significant at less than .01. 
TABLE XII1 MANHOURS PER PATIENT DAY BY OWNERSHIP 
OWNERSHIP MEANS MEDIAN F-SCORE SIG. 
NONPROFIT 21.99 21.17 
GOVERN11ENT 21.76 20.97 
FORPROFIT 17.94 18.04 
BRAND MEAN 20.11 2S.6B <.01 
There were fewer manhours per patient day in the 
forprafit hospital. This was statistically significant 
compared to nonprofit and government hospitals <Table 
XIII>. 
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TABLE XIII• MANHOURS PER PATIENT DAY 
A NOVA AN OVA M-W 
F-SCORE SIB. SIB. 
NP v• G .04 NS NB CNB•> 
FP v• a 20.12 <.01 <.01 ((. 01*) 
NP v• CFP> 39.86 <.01 <.01 
The difference was not significant between the nonprofit 
and the government hospital. 
The importance of manhours in determining casts of 
delivering care is further exemplified as follows. In 
the analysis of 160 acute care general hospitals in the 
state of Florida using 1985 HCCB budget data, the number 
of manhours per patient day was demonstrated to be a 
significant predictor in the variation of average cost 
per patient day <DAYCOST> and average cost per admission 
(ADMCOST>. Analysis of variance results <Note Table 
XIV> shows manhour differences among nonprofit, 
government, and forprofit hospitals at less than .01 
<Sorrentino, 1985>. 
TABLE XIV• ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE RESULTS FOR 1985 DATA 
VARIABLE F-SCORE BIG. R2 
DAY COST 2.93 NS .12 
ADMCOST 2.4~ NS .42 
MANHOURS 26.26 <.01 .39 
A cost-conscious, pro~it-seeking hospital has been 
theorized to reduce manhours per patient day to reduce 
costs associated with labor. Multiple regression 
analysis was done using nonpro~it, government, bed size, 
Medicare days, and Medicaid days as predictors. We ~ind 
the R square at 47.1/.. We con~irmed di~ferences in 
ownership categories but failed to see statistically 
significant t-ratios on bed size, Medicare days, and 
Medicaid days (1.56, -1.06, -.62 respectively>. 
Our results give support for cost-reducing behavior 
in the forprofit sector and this could also mean 
differences in services offered. You will recall that 
ather goals such as education and research were 
identified with nonprofit and government hospitals. At 
the same time, there may be certain services provided to 
patients in government and nonpro~it hospitals which 
could affect their resource requirements. Although the 
study population selected only hospitals o~~ering acute 
care general services, within these groups a~ hospitals, 
there are other sources o~ variations such as whether or 
not a hospital has resources to allow specialty services 
such as open heart surgery. This type a~ surgical 
procedure is resource intensive. It requires a 
specially trained sta~f o~ physicians, nurses, and 
technicians, as well as sophisticated operating rooms, 
cardiac catheterization laboratories, heart/lung bypass 
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machines, intra-aortic counterpulsation devices, and 
hemodynamic monitoring of all cardiac function 
parameters. Let us examine closely, this aspect of 
service in the three hospital types. 
As of 1986, there were twenty centers in Florida 
with capabilities to provide for open heart surgery. 
Nine hospitals in our study population Tor Dade County 
offer this service. Of these, seven <7> are nonprofit, 
one <1> government, and one <1> forprofit <The hospital 
used to be nonprofit until it was purchased by an 
investor-chain corporation.). In Dade County, from the 
period of January 1 to December 1, 1985, a total of 1874 
open heart surgeries were performed <HCSF, 1986). Of 
these, nonprofit hospitals did 84/. <1560>, the 
government hospital did ll'l. <216>, and the forprofit 
hospital did 5% (98). Actual cost to a hospital for 
doing these procedures are unobtainable. However, 
through personal communications, it was determined that 
the amounts reimbursed under DRG limitations for a 
simple cardiac catheterization <required prior to open 
heart surgery) is only $6,935 and for a coronary artery 
bypass graft is $16,314. Administrators contend that in 
general, these patients are 11 money-losers" because more 
often than not, the patients require a longer 
hospitalization period than projected under DRGs. 
Obviously, forprofits will not have the incentive to 
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perform this kind of procedure. 
Each hospital was examined for the number of 
manhours per patient day. It was not surprising to find 
that the mean of 24.40 hours for these hospitals was 
statistically different from the grand mean of 20 for 
all hospitals in the study. Thus, a hospital that seeks 
to maximize profits would reduce costs by decreasing 
labor requirements. The obvious way, as we have seen 
here, is not to offer certain types of services that are 
resource intensive. 
We analyze the data further in our study 
population, relating variation in manhours with 
ancillary expenses. Using multiple regression, we use 
ancillary services, nonprofity and government as 
predictors for manhours. With an R square of 48.4/., we 
note that ancillary expenses, nonprofit, and government 
hospitals as statistically significant predictors of 
manhours < t-ratios of 2.42, 5.27, 3.0 respectively). 
In sum, a forprofit hospital seeking to maximize 
profits may limit its services to those who do not 
require substantial resources that impinge on residual 
profits. From what is demonstrated at the micro level, 
it is notable that there is output maximization (in 
terms of cardiac surgeries) in the nonprofit hospitals. 
This finding also helps to explain hospital behavior 
using the 41 desired status 11 rationale by Lin (1971>. As 
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a high-tech procedure, one might say that open heart 
surgeries are 11 prestige enhancers ... 
In Chapter III, it was noted that reducing costs 
associated with labor would be a mechanism to maximize 
profits. Seeking proof of this, the salaries per FTE 
were compared. 
Salaries per FTE (Hypothesis BSJ. Here, the 
results were not significant. Note Table XV. 
TABLE XVa SALARIES PER F. T. E. BV OWNERSHIP 
OWNERSHIP MEAN MEDIAN BIG. 
NONPROFIT 19792 20320 
GOVERNMENT 186~4 194~7 
FORPROFIT 1979~ 19260 
GRAND MEAN 19631 NS 
Nonprofit hospital salaries were practically 
identical to forprofit salaries, but paid slightly more 
in comparison to government hospitals. 
TABLE XVI 1 SALARIES PER F. T. E 
ANOVA A NOVA M-W 
F-SCORE SIG. BIG. 
NP v• CG> 3.2~ NB <NS> NS <NS> 
FP v• CG) 2.06 NS <NB) NS CNS> 
NP va <FP> 0 NB NS 
There is no support for the property rights 
position as it relates to salaries per FTE; note Table 
XVI. Although we did not find differences as to 
ownership categories, the comparisons by location did 
show statistically significant differences at <.01 with 
Palm Beach having the lowest and Dade having the most. 
It is important to note, though, that there are 
other factors to consider, such as bonuses or profit-
sharing plans for administrative staff which are not 
reflected under salaries per FTE. Stock options, for 
example, can not be measured in terms of salaries per 
FTE. 
In search of evidence of hospital behavior 
differences, using the top twenty DRGs for all the 
hospitals under study, the length of stay per DRG, 
charges per DRG, and reimbursements per DRG were 
analyzed yielding the following results. 
Length of Stay per DRG [Hypothesis B6J. Note Table 
XVII showing all twenty DRGs by hospital ownerhip 
status. The findings show that only 7 of 20 DRGs <35/.) 
were significantly different in terms of length of stay. 
These were DRG 82 <Respiratory Neoplasms>, DRG 140 
<Angina), DRG 243 (Medical Back Problems>, Drg 296 
<Nutritional and Miscellaneous Metabolic Disorders; age 
aver 69), DRG 320 <Kidney and Urinary Tract Infections; 
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TABLE XVIII LENGTH OF STAY BY DRG BY OWNERSHIP 
GRAND CELL MEANS 
DRG MEAN NONPROF GOVT FORPROF F-BCORE BIG. R2 
14 10.46 10.89 10.9~ 9.94 .84 ns .07 
15 ~.61 ~.47 ~.39 ~.eo .37 n• .07 
82 8.70 9.70 9.98 7.46 3.S9 .03 .18 
as 7.84 8.28 8.02 7.41 1.14 ns .13 
89 9.49 9.70 9.12 a. eo .47 n• .32 
96 7.0~ 7.~9 6.03 6.91 2.91 n• .1S 
122 9.2~ 9.S4 a.e~ 9.13 .46 ns .18 
127 e.oe 8.39 7.99 7.86 1. 03 n• .32 
138 ~.76 ~.78 6.09 ~.64 .3S n• .17 
140 5.34 ~.73 ~.19 ~.06 6.6~ <.01 .32 
148 16.38 16.07 14.~1 17.22 1. 73 n• .22 
174 6.71 6.98 ~.92 6.73 1. so n• .18 
182 ~.70 ~.62 ~-7~ ~.76 .10 ns .07 
210 1~.01 15.89 13.00 15.13 1.36 n• • 29 
243 7.4~ 7.96 6.3~ 7.36 4.18 .o~ • 39 
294 7.80 7.80 7.74 7.83 .01 ns .19 
296 7.72 6.9S 9.79 7.73 4.8~ .01 .17 
320 7.97 8.47 6.:57 7.98 3.73 .o~ • 26 
336 7.6~ 7.~9 6.01 8.21 3.36 .o~ .33 
468 14.44 13.83 21.~0 12.79 6.81 <.01 .22 
over 69 with complications and comorbidity>, DRS 336 
<Transurethral Prostatectomy; age over 69 with 
complications and comorbidity>, and DRG 468 <Unrelated 
Operating Room Procedure to a given Medical Diagnostic 
Category>. On 13 out of 20 DRGs <65'l.>, the length of 
stay was not statistically dif~erent. 
The analytical framework implied that government 
hospitals by virtue of their size may be able to offer 
needed services. This is consistent, as ~ell, ~ith the 
public interest motive or expansion of services to 
society. Note that on Table XVIII, government hospitals 
had the highest lengths of stay on five DRS categories, 
nonprofits were highest on ten DRG categories, and 
forprofits were highest in five DRG categories. We test 
for significance to see evidence of longer lengths of 
stay, even though ~ith DRG reimbursement rules there is 
increased incentive to decrease lengths of stay. The 
DRG analysis was done on all DRGs where differences ~ere 
significant [ DRG 82, 140, 243, 296, 320, 336, 468 ]. 
Controlling for the number of discharges per DRG, 
government hospitals were compared to nonprofit 
hospitals on length of stay (note Table XVIII>. 
Statistically significant differences on DRG 296, 320, 
and 468 were discerned with government hospitals having 
significantly higher lengths of stay in two DRGs only. 
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TABLE XVIIIt LENGTH OF STAY BY DRG 
NONPROFIT vs. GOVERNMENT 
ADJUSTED DEVIATIONS 
FOR INDEP. .. CDVAR • 
DRG MEANS F-SCORE BIG. R-SQ. NONPROF. GOVT. 
82 9.73 .03 NS .10 -.03 .09 
140 s.ss 2.47 NS .09 .13 -.38 
243 7.53 3.78 NS .2:5 .37 -1.02 
296 7.70 6.67 .01 .21 .77 2.11 
320 7.97 s.so <.OS .20 .47 -1.29 
336 7.17 1.87 NS .07 .39 -1.97 
468 1S.S7 :5.24 <.OS .17 -2.02 s.ss 
TABLE XIX a LENGTH OF STAY BY DRB 
GOVERNMENT VB FORPROFIT 
ADJUSTED DEVIATIONS 
FOR INDEP. lc COVAR. 
DRG MEANS F-BCORE SIG. R-SCI. FORPROF. GOVT. 
82 e.os 4.1:5 .os .14 -.66 2.16 
140 ~.oa .24 NS .03 -.02 .09 
243 7.12 2.08 NS .18 .24 -.79 
296 8.21 4.43 <.O~ .19 -.S2 1. 70 
320 7.6:5 3.44 NB .13 .32 -1.04 
336 7.?0 4.73 <.OS .1S .S3 -1.73 
468 14.84 7.S4 <.01 .21 -2.2S 7.31 
Signi~icant differences were present in DRG 82, 296, 
336, and 468 with government hospitals having longer 
lengths of stay in three DRGs <82, 296, 468>; note Table 
XIX. 
The forprofits compared to government hospitals 
limit length of stay at statistically significant levels 
on three DRGs <82, 296, 468). This behavior can be 
viewed as an effort to decrease costs, particularly when 
reimbursement limits are in place. If a hospital 
consistently has their patients exceed allowable length 
of stay under DRGs, costs per patient day are bound to 
increase <See 1985 data: regression analysis reflect 
average length of stay as a significant predictor 
TABLE XX1 LENGTH OF STAY BY DRS 
FORPRDFIT VS. NONPROFIT 
ADJUSTED DEVIATIONS 
FOR INDEP. lc COVAR. 
DRG MEANS F-SCDRE BIG. R-SQ. FORPROF. NONPROF. 
82 B.4S 7.:52 <.01 .16 -1.16 1.37 
140 S.36 10.34 <.01 .19 -.29 .::ss 
243 7.63 2.79 NB • 11 -.22 .26 
296 7.3:5 2.88 NS .13 .4S -.S3 
320 8.21 1. 27 NB .03 -.24 .29 
336 7.93 1. 02 NB .04 -.20 -.24 
468 13.26 .98 NS .1S .001 .001 
Sorrentino, 1985>. The forprofits were compared to 
nonprofit hospitals <Table XX>. Note that out of seven 
DRGs, there were only significant differences in two 
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diagnostic categories. In comparison to the nonprofits, 
the lengths of stay were significantly lower in the 
forprofit hospitals on DRG categories 82 and 140. 
In general, though, there were thirteen (13) DRGs 
which showed no statistically significant differences. 
Thus, with regard to length of stay by DRG, we fail to 
find evidence in support of the property rights view. 
Charges Per DRG. Note Table XXI. On 13 out of 20 
DRGs <65'l.>, charges were statistically different among 
three hospital types. These DRGs were: DRG 15 
<Transient Ischemic Attack>, DRG 89 (Simple Pneumonia 
and Pleurisy, age over 69 with complications and 
comorbidity>, DRG 127 <Heart Failure, Shock>, DRG 140 
<Angina>, DRG 148 <Major Small and Large Bowel 
Procedure, age over 69 with complications and 
comorbidity), DRG 174 <Gastrointestinal Hemorrhage, age 
over 69 with complications and comorbidity), DRG 182 
<Esophageal, Gastrointestinal, Miscellaneous Digestive 
Disease, age over 69 with complications and 
comorbidity>, DRG 210 <Hip and Femur Procedure, except 
major joint, age over 69 with complications and 
comorbidity>, DRG 243 <Medical Back Problems>, DRG 296 
<Nutritional and miscellaneous Metabolic Disorders, age 
over 69 with complications and comorbidity>, DRG 320 
<Kidney and U~inary Tract Infections; age over 69 with 
complications and comorbidity>, DRG 336 <Transurethral 
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TABLE XXII CHARGES BY DRG BV OWNERSHIP 
DRG GRAND CELL MEANS 
MEANS NONPROF aovT FOR PROF F-SCORE BIG. R2 
14 7288 700~ 6920 7640 .4S ne .13 
15 3343 2984 2673 3&~3 4.16 .os .13 
82 6008 5872 6386 6007 .12 ne .09 
88 6194 61SB S9SB 6297 .OS ne .os 
89 784:5 7101 6777 8803 s.o~ .01 .36 
96 ~129 5141 4283 S37B 1.98 na .23 
122 667~ 6389 5944 7142 2.18 n• .28 
127 6022 5~6~ 5295 6633 4.S~ <.01 .33 
138 4188 38~1 4134 4489 1.53 na .17 
140 3730 3589 318S 4017 3.91 .os .57 
148 17252 15229 13363 20159 7.83 <.01 .40 
174 5073 47S6 3857 5703 6.06 <.01 .::s~ 
182 3469 3136 3006 3893 3.98 .os .22 
210 11175 10368 8531 12672 ?.sa .01 .::sa 
243 3SS1 3499 2S8S 39S6 10.24 .01 .52 
294 4308 3928 4115 4691 1. 59 n• .21 
296 4699 3826 S187 S286 4.39 .01 .21 
320 50!17 4872 3SS2 5677 7.51 .01 .37 
336 5586 S159 3825 6488 10.83 .01 .43 
468 12926 11689 16737 12801 3.05 .05 .36 
Pr-ostatectomy; age over 69 with complications and comorbidity>, 
and DRG 468 <Unrelated Operating Room Procedure to a given 
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Medical Diagnostic Category>. 
TABLE XXIII CHARBEB BV DRS 
FORPROFIT vs SOYERNt1ENT 
ADJUSTED DEVIATIONS 
FOR INDEP. lc COVAR. 
DRG MEANS F-SCORE BIG. R-BQ. FORPROF. GOVT. 
15 3~75 4.34 .o~ .12 277 -901 
89 8327 3.21 NS .10 471 -1~32 
127 6318 5.02 <.05 .lS 328 -1067 
140 3821 7.32 .01 .19 196 -636 
148 19~60 7.SS <.01 .S1 1871 -6082 
174 S269 8.33 <.01 .22 449 -1460 
182 3684 3.17 NS .02 200 -6S3 
210 11698 8.9S <.01 .28 1119 -3637 
243 3633 14.19 <.01 .40 327 -1063 
296 ~263 .01 NB .01 10 -32 
320 S177 11.88 <.01 • 32 4BS -1S87 
336 S862 14.91 <.01 .34 637 -2071 
468 13727 2.96 NS • 11 -778 2S29 
Property rights theory would predict that nonprofits and 
government hospitals will demonstrate lower charges per DRG. 
Forprofit hospitals attempting to maximize profits would have 
higher charges per DRG. To test for this, the forprofit 
hospitals were compared to government hospitals on the DRGs 
where initial comparisons showed statistical significance. 
At a glance <Table XXII>, the forprofit hospitals show 
higher charges on 12 aut of 13 DRGs. On 9 DRGs, 
charges were statistically higher. Comparing the 
forprafits to the nonprafits <Table XXIII>, the 
forprofits had significantly higher charges on ten DRGs. 
TABLE XXIII1 
DRG MEANS 
1S 
89 8024 
127 6143 
140 3820 
148 17900 
174 S2BO 
182 3546 
210 11616 
243 3747 
296 4617 
320 S30B 
336 ~879 
468 12291 
CHARGES BV DRG 
FORPROFITS VB. NONPROFIT 
ADJUSTED DEVIATIONS 
FOR INDEP. ~ COVAR. 
F-SCORE SIG. R-SQ. FORPROF. NONPROF. 
S.24 <.OS .10 398 -470 
<.OS .11 7SS -928 
S.07 <.OS .10 -609 
2.83 NS .06 206 -244 
8.93 <. 01 • 44 2440 -2883 
4.43 <.OS .11 360 -44S 
5.59 <.OS .12 324 -383 
7.06 <.01 .14 1003 -11BS 
NS .12 242 -286 
10.22 <.01 .23 7S7 -89S 
3.74 <.OS .12 401 -474 
8.49 <.01 .17 S46 -646 
.73 NS .12 1025 -1212 
Forprofit hospital behavior was consistent with 
profit maximization as reflected by higher charges. 
t th · s This is consistent There is evidence to suppor 1 • 
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with the expectation that charges in nonprofit and 
government hospitals would be lower since they 
receive tax exemptions and philantropic donations. 
The results on Table XXIV below show that nonprofits 
TABLE XXIVa 
DRG MEANS 
1~ 2901 
89 7015 
127 
140 3481 
148 14731 
174 4~08 
182 3101 
210 9878 
243 32SS 
296 4189 
320 4S20 
336 4803 
468 1303S 
CHARGES BV DRG 
NONPROFITB VS. GOVERNMENT 
ADJUSTED DEVIATIONS 
FOR INDEP. • COVAR. 
F-SCORE SIG. R-SQ. NONPROF. GOVT. 
.71 NS .04 73 -201 
NS .02 -142 
.17 NS .02 66 -183 
1.08 NS .OS 99 -274 
.69 NS .16 S19 -1429 
1.87 NS .06 246 -647 
.19 NS .03 26 -72 
1.10 NS .0~ 476 -1308 
4.81 <.OS .23 221 -609 
3.67 NS .18 3S4 10!58 
6.07 <.OS • 28 309 -8~1 
NS .09 3SO -962 
S.77 <.OS .18 -1361 3744 
compared to government hospitals show statistically 
higher charges in only two <2> DRGs [DRG 243 and 320]. 
In all other DRGs, there was no statistical significance 
of the lower charges in government hospitals in 
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comparison to the nonprofits. 
Reimbursements Per DRG. The present reimbursement 
system sets fixed prices for hospital services. Note 
Table XXV. In the majority of the DRGs C70X>, the 
findings indicate no significant differences. The 
differences were significant in six DRGs <30%>: DRS 14 
< Specific Cerebrovascular Disorders except for 
Transient Ischemic Attack>, DRG 174 <Gastrointestinal 
Hemorrhage, age over 69 with complications and 
comorbidity>, DRG 210 <Hip and Femur Procedure, except 
major joint, age over 69 with complications and 
comorbidity>, DRG 243 <Medical Back Problems>, DRG 320 
<Kidney and Urinary Tract Infections, age over 69 with 
complications and comorbidity>, DRG 336 <Transurethral 
Prostatectomy, age over 69 with complications and 
comorbidity>. 
According to the property rights theory, a 
forprofit hospital would demonstrate higher 
reimbursements to maximize return on investment. 
Even though pricing is fixed, accurate classification of 
patients by coding, thorough physician documentation of 
all complications and associated procedures, allow 
recouping the most reimbursement monies. 
Noting Table XXV, forprofit hospitals show 
statistically higher reimbursements in four DRGs C14, 
210, 320, 336). Nonprofits were statistically higher in 
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two DRGs (174, 320). 
TABLE XXV I REIMBURSEMENTS BY DRG BV OWNERSHIP TYPE 
GRAND CELL MEANS 
DRG MEAN NDNPROF GOVT FORPROF F-SCORE SIG. R2 
14 4336 4387 3778 4464 3.30 .OS .37 
1S 1969 1923 1869 2039 .91 n• .21 
82 3688 3768 3400 3709 2.34 n• .43 
SB 32S6 3129 30~4 3210 1. 02 n• .20 
89 3774 3S77 3203 4116 .83 n• .oe 
96 2467 251S 2260 2490 2.32 n• .43 
122 4240 4254 3699 4394 1. 81 n• .26 
127 3330 3383 3059 3369 2.66 n• .47 
138 2877 2849 2721 2947 .ss na .21 
140 2310 2363 2097 2330 2.93 n• .46 
148 8188 8232 7135 8474 1.83 n• .30 
174 2891 2979 2424 2963 s.oo .01 .42 
182 1865 1901 1692 1886 2.30 n• .41 
210 6565 6700 5033 6922 ~.35 .01 .30 
243 2332 2329 1889 2471 3.62 .os .31 
294 2491 2522 2299 2526 2.41 n• .46 
296 2887 2918 2692 2922 1.65 na .43 
320 2533 2611 2110 2596 6.10 <.01 .46 
336 3035 3076 2321 3220 s.~s .01 .36 
468 6854 7043 66?6 6750 .41 n• .20 
Government hospitals were consistently lowest in 
reimbursements per DRG. 
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TABLE XXVIa REIMBURSEMENTS BV DRS 
GOVERNMENT VB. FDRPROFJT 
ADJUSTED DEVIATIONS 
FOR INDEP. & COVAR. 
DRG MEANS F-SCORE BIG. R-BQ. FORPRDF. SOVT. 
14 4303 3.64 NS • 11 173 -S62 
140 227S 2.63 NB .09 ~4 -177 
174 2836 4.23 .OS .12 130 -424 
210 6477 7.69 <.01 .24 sos -1640 
243 2333 3.9S .OS .12 137 -447 
320 2482 5.23 <.OS .1B 111 -362 
336 3008 7.~0 .01 .20 21S -699 
TABLE XXVIII REIMBURSEMENTS BV DRG 
FDRPROFIT VS. NONPROFIT 
ADJUSTED DEVIATIONS 
FOR INDEP. &c COVAR. 
DRG MEANS F-SCCRE BIG. R-SQ. FORPROF. NONPROF. 
14 4429 .1S NS .01 12 -14 
140 234S .12 NS .02 -23 -27 
174 2970 .01 NS .09 -46 S7 
210 6820 .30 NS .007 112 -132 
243 240S .79 NB .02 64 -76 
320 2603 .02 NS .oo 7 
-· 
336 31S4 .60 NS .02 4S S3 
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TABLE XXVI I I 1 REIMBURSEMENTS BY DRG 
NONPROFIT VB. GOVERNMENT 
ADJUSTED DEVIATIONS 
FOR INDEP • • COVAR. DRG MEANS F-BCORE BIG. R-SQ. NONPROF. GOVT. 
14 422~ 3.08 NB .13 1~4 -424 
140 234:5 .12 NS .02 27 -23 
174 2926 4.13 .os .14 1~2 -400 
210 62SS 3.66 NS .21 424 -1167 
243 2211 4.~9 <.OS .17 111 -30S 
320 2478 4.91 <.0~ .19 123 -340 
336 2973 3.19 NS .12 18S -S09 
Fo~p~ofit hospitals had signi~icantly higher 
reimbu~sements than government hospitals on five DRG 
categories <Table XXVI>. In comparison to the 
nonprofit hospitals, though, differences were not 
significant at all <Table XXVII>. Nonprofit hospitals 
we~e compared to the government hospitals <Table 
XXVIII>. Government hospitals show lower 
reimbursements, but these were statistically significant 
in only three DRGs. 
Analyzing for trends, note that where there are 
differences in lengths of stay in seven DRGs <Bl, 140, 
243, 320, 336, 468>, we find that six of these DRGs 
(140, 243, 296, 320, 336, 468> were significantly 
dif~erent in charges as well. Only in two of these DRGs 
<320 and 336) were reimbursements statistically 
different. 
Thus, our findings showed that reimbursements per 
DRG were higher in the forprofit hospitals than both 
nonprofit and government hospitals. Although the 
sophisticated classification of the DRGs is complicated, 
and the amount reimbursed to the hospital should be the 
same regardless of ownership status, there are factors 
to consider which may account for differences. As 
indicated earlier, operational efficiencies, such as 
ensuring detailed physician documentation and proper 
coding in the medical records department, allow accurate 
patient classification in the appropriate DRG 
categories. Again, we did not find the difference we 
expected according to the property rights theory. 
Conclusion. In the context of efficiency, the 
evidence for property rights is mixed. Hospitals 
differed significantly on bad debts, manhours, and 
charges per DRG. In terms of occupancy rates, the study 
findings showed both nonprofit and government hospitals 
with higher occupancy rates. However, we found 
significant differences between nonprofits and 
forprofits only. Nonprofit hospital behavior here is 
consistent with the output maximization rationale. Our 
analyses did not support the property rights argument in 
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the forprofit hospitals. Other possibilities which 
might explain differences include variations in cases 
treated in each hospital; the patients may stay longer 
such that occupancy rates show a high figure. Our 
analyses on length of stay by DRG ruled this out. 
Another possibility is the factor associated with 
physician affiliation with certain hospital ownership 
types. Early on, this study referred to the physician#s 
cooperative hypothesis advanced by Pauly and Redisch 
(1973> for the nonprofit hospital. The indirect 
implication would be the economic interests of the 
physician as far as being a 11 high admitter ... As one 
looks at the advantages of admitting to a certain 
hospital as opposed to another, the picture becomes 
more obscure because the physicians are the primary 
decision-makers in hospital admissions. Their obvious 
authority is needed, by the same token, to discharge a 
patient. Physician practice patterns in the three 
ownership categories could affect occupancy rates. 
factor is interesting but access to this type of 
This 
information is extremely limited. Subsequent studies 
should consider this measure in the future. 
In relation to ancillary expenses, we found no 
support for the property rights theory. One o-f the 
concerns regarding DRGs was that profit-seeking 
hospitals will attempt to minimize the expenditures 
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associated with delivery of care by decreasing 
utilization of ancillary services because reimbursement 
of expenses is fixed. Regardless of the amount of 
ancillary services provided, the monies a hospital would 
receive will be dependent on the amount allotted for 
that particular DRG. It is logical that a profit-
seeking hospital would minimize ancillary service 
expenditures. The ancillary expenses in the forprofit 
hospital were lower. The higher ancillary service 
expenditures in the government hospitals, although not 
statistically higher in our sample, could be attributed 
to many factors, such as: ( 1) government hospitals are 
larger <although comparisons have been controlled for 
bed size); <2> government hospitals have affiliating 
medical and nursing schools, and as such, adherence to 
standard treatment protocols requiring certain ancillary 
services may be routine; and (3) there was a higher 
number of Medicaid patients for the government hospitals 
in this study. Their health status could have been 
poorer. They may have been sicker, as well. In the 
case of the forprofits, we know that they have fewer 
Medicaid patients than government hospitals. Thus, 
these factors which affect variability in expenses for 
ancillary services due to differences in utilization by 
patient type need to be kept in mind. The analyses here 
were not on ancillary expenses by DRG category <These 
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data were not available.). Our multiple regression 
analysis on ancillary expenses showed bed size, Medicare 
days, and Medicaid days as significant predictors. This 
confirmed the first and third possibility. In this 
sample, there was one nonprofit hospital with an active 
affiliation with a medical and nursing school. This 
study was limited in that the thorough investigation of 
this aspect was not done. 
this area closely. 
Future studies should examine 
What is surprising is the behavior of the 
nonprofit hospitals, particularly in terms of bad debts, 
charges and reimbursements. 
of the forprofit hospitals. 
Their behavior mimics that 
This makes less clear the 
distinction between nonprofit and forprofit hospitals. 
In terms of operational efficiency, these analyses imply 
that nonprofit hospital behavior approximates that of 
the forprofits in certain ways. This was evident 
particularly when bad debts were examined. When this is 
related to the finding that the amount of uncompensated 
care is a statistically significant predictor of bad 
debts, the behavior of the nonprofit hospitals does seem 
to be consistent with the expectation. 
The evidence seen in this study on manhours per 
patient day showed that both nonprofit and government 
hospitals had higher hours than the forprofits. Earlier 
in this study, it was noted that nonprofit and 
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government hospitals were larger <in terms of bed size). 
This study controlled +or this statistically. 
It has also been mentioned that human resources are 
required to staf+ more hospital beds. As such, manpower 
on a twenty-~our hour basis is shown as its highest 
operational expenditure. The rational response from a 
profit-maximization standpoint would be to decrease 
manhaurs per patient day. 
By the same token, if one is to decrease the number 
of manhours to decrease expenditures, one would also 
decrease expenditures associated with salaries. The 
study results showed no significant difference among 
nonpro+it, government, and forprofit hospitals. 
Nonprofit and forprofit salaries were practically 
identical; government hospitals were the least. 
However, bear in mind that manhours per patient day in 
both the government and nonprofit hospitals were higher 
than the forprofits. It is amazing to find the 
nonprofits with higher manhours and yet, with pay 
similar to the forprofits. This can be construed as a 
11 fringe benefit .. for the employees of the nonprofit and 
government hospitals. With higher manhours, workload 
per FTE is lower than the forprofits. In essence, this 
strengthens the property rights position. 
The concern for variability of cases treated in the 
hospitals brought us to analyze ~or each o~ the twenty 
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DRGs, the length of stay, charges, and reimbursements. 
On length of stay, the findings showed that there were 
no significant dif+erences among hospitals on 65X of the 
DRGs. On examining each average length of stay per DRG 
in the forprofit hospital, it was consistently lower in 
8 out of 20 DRGs <although not necessarily significant>. 
Yet, this did not translate into lower charges per DRG. 
The charges per DRG were significantly different 
among the three hospital types on 65/. of the DRGs. 
Consistently, charges per DRG in the forprofit hospital 
were higher. Nonprofit hospital charges were higher 
than government hospitals but lower than forprofit 
hospitals. 
As can be expected, fixed reimbursement rule 
effects are demonstrated in the study results. The 
majority of reimbursements (70/.) per DRG were not 
significantly different. The higher reimbursement to 
the forprofit hospitals on 12 out of 20 DRGs (although 
not significantly higher> shows us that there are ways 
by which hospitals can, within a DRG category, recoup 
the most amount of monies. These creative strategies 
make future analyses of hospital behavior challenging, 
particularly when there are difficulties associated with 
retrieval and access to most relevant data. 
Let us reiterate, though, that there were a number 
of cases in which property rights theory could predict 
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differences that were not found. These were in regard 
to occupancy rates, ancillary expenses, salaries per 
FTE, lengths of stay per DRG, and reimbursements per 
DRG. Nonprofit, government, and forprofit hospitals 
were not significantly different in terms of salaries 
per FTE. In the majority of the DRGs, lengths of stay 
and reimbursements were not significantly different. 
The provision of health care in the nonprofit form 
is encouraged through the tax incentives and on the 
forprofit side by accrual of net revenues to 
shareholders. Several variables of efficiency were 
explored to compare nonprofit, government, and forprofit 
hospitals to obtain evidence in support of the property 
rights theory. Some mixed evidence supporting the 
property rights theory has been presented. However, 
caution must be exercised in generalizing the findings 
of this study. Several questions remain unanswered. Of 
particular importance is the aspect of what purchasers 
of health care services are willing to pay. Private 
insurance companies pay differently as opposed to 
Medicare or Medicaid. Although twenty DRGs were 
investigated in this study across all hospital types in 
an attempt to control for product differences, the 
extent to which hospitals may shift costs of care among 
different payers would be a crucial dimension for future 
studies. 
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If there is an economic orientation on the part of 
nonprofits in the light of the present cost-containment 
policies, to what extent do nonprofit hospitals fulfill 
their social obligations? The question lingers for all 
other types of hospital ownership status, as well. In 
this context, ~urther analysis was done to better 
understand issues relating to equity. 
EQUITY 
Nonprofit, government, and forprofit are now 
compared in the context of equity by analyzing data on 
Medicare, Medicaid, and Uncompensated Care. 
Medicare [Hypothesis ClJ. Note Table XXIX which 
shows statistically significant differences by ownership 
status: 
TABLE XXIX1 
OWNERSHIP 
NONPROFIT 
GOVERNMENT 
FORPROFIT 
GRAND MEAN 
MEDICARE DAYS BY OWNERSHIP 
MEAN 
54102 
48804 
34S78 
4::5932 
MEDIAN 
57752 
~94~S 
29891 
F-BCORE BIG. 
<.01 
Comparing nonprofits to the government hospitals, note 
that the government hospitals had fewer Medicare days 
by 5298. This was not statistically significant <Table 
XX X>. 
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TABLE XXXa MEDICARE DAYS 
AND VA ANOVA M-W 
F-SCORE BIG. Big. 
NP v• G .23 NB NS CNS*) 
FP v• 8 3.94 .o~ NS <NS*> 
NP v• FP 1~.S9 .01 .02 
Forprofits compared to government hospitals, the 
government sector had more Medicare days by 14226. 
ANOVA results show statistical significance at .05. 
Nonprofits compared to forprofits were significantly 
different, with farprofits having fewer Medicare days by 
19524. This was statistically significant at .01. Mann-
Whitney analysis confirm ANDVA results except for the 
comparison between the forprofit and government 
hospitals. There was no significant difference in the 
medians of the two hospitals. 
Nonprofits have the highest mean number of 
Medicare days. This finding can be interpreted in three 
ways: (1) Nonprofit hospitals give care to Medicare 
patients from a fiduciary standpoint, i. e. social 
obligation to do so; this behavior is consistent with 
output maximization. ( 2> Fewer mean Medicare days in 
the forprofit hospitals in comparison to the nonprofit 
hospital could be .. avoidance behavior~~ by this sector 
because of DRG reimbursement for Medicare patients. The 
forprofit hospitals have been known to follow 
legislative events closely and consequently are able to 
~eact to impending reimbursement rules quicker than 
nonprofits. The limitations on reimbursement for 
Medicare patients make this market less attactive to 
profit-seeking hospitals. <3> Fewer mean Medicare days 
in the government hospitals compared to nonprofits may 
be due to physician practice patterns. <Note that when 
medians are examined, there is no significant 
difference). There could be preference or priority 
given to the treatment of trauma, emergency cases, or 
acute care rather than the chronic debilitation that 
characterizes Medicare recipients who are 65 years and 
over. 
In the analysis on location, it was mentioned that 
certain geographic areas were found to have higher 
Medicare enrollees <highest in Palm Beach>. Looking 
for further evidence to explain forprofit behavior, note 
Table XXXI which shows no significant difference by 
location in terms of Medicare days. There are fewer 
forprofit hospitals than government hospitals in Palm 
Beach <Note earlier, Table II showed hospital ownership 
by location.>. These findings show support of the 
"avoidance behavior 11 by forprofits or on the government 
side, the fiduciary obligation to meet the society's 
needs (output maximization> in areas where the private 
sector do not thrive. This may also imply that the 
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elderly simply live in older communities where hospitals 
were established prior to the increase in the number of 
forprofit hospitals. 
TABLE XXXIt MEDICARE DAYS BY LOCATION 
LOCATION 
PALM BEACH 
BROWARD 
DADE 
BRAND MEAN 
MEAN 
37308 
4613.7 
44980 
43932 
F-SCDRE 
2.74 
SIB. 
NS 
Medicaid. Note Table XXXII which indicates that 
government hospitals provided the most under Medicaid 
(16493). Both nonprofits and forpro+its provided less. 
TABLE XXXIII MEDICAID DAYS BV OWNERSHIP 
OWNERSHIP MEAN 
NONPROFIT 3469 
GOVERNMENT 16493 
FORPROFIT 2306 
GRAND MEAN 4759 ~~~~~~------
MEDIAN 
3137 
3802 
356 
F-SCORE 
27.05 
SIG. 
<.01 
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Table XXXIII shows very interesting findings. According 
to the property rights theory, we should expect to see 
significantly more Medicaid days in nonprofit and 
TABLE XXXIII• MEDICAID DAYS 
AN OVA A NOVA M-W 
F-SCORE BIG. SIG. 
NP v• G 15.81 <.01 .05 <NB*> 
FP vs G 23.97 <.01 <.01 ((. 01*) 
NP vs <FP> .93 NS NS 
government hospitals in comparison to forprofit 
hospitals. Further analyzing the data, no statistically 
significant difference was found between nonprofits and 
forprofits. Analysis of variance results controlling 
for bed size showed the F-score at .93. Median levels 
were compared and results were not significant. It is 
very important to take note, here, that in our sample of 
27 farprafit hospitals, 9 hospitals showed zero Medicaid 
days. There were 3 nonprofit hospitals out of 21 with 
zero Medicaid days as well. In both ANOVA and Mann-
Whitney analyses, forprofits compared to government 
hospitals were statistically different at less than .01. 
Theoretically, nonprofit behavior patterns should 
reflect its fiduciary goals. Comparing nonprofit 
hospitals to government hospitals, nonprofit hospitals 
had significantly fewer Medicaid days. However~ when a 
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large county hospital is eliminated from the sample, the 
level of signficance fails to reach the .05 level 
(significance at .08>. The provision of care to the 
indigents by government hospitals as evidenced by the 
number of Medicaid days was significantly higher than 
forprofit hospitals. The nonprofits, though, fail to 
demonstrate statistically higher Medicaid days compared 
to their forprofit counterpart. 
Further analysis using multiple regression was 
done. With forprofit hospitals as the reference 
category, we regress Medicaid days on three predictors: 
bed size, nonprofit hospitals, and government hospitals. 
With R square at 60.1/., we found t-ratios 7.07, -1.08, 
and 2.16 respectively. One government hospital outlier 
was removed. The R square is lowered to 34.1/. and t-
ratios were 3.98, -.36, 2.17 respectively. 
The preceding analysis reaffirms our conclusion 
that government hospitals have significantly higher 
Medicaid days. The negative t-ratios for the nonprofit 
hospitals indicate that Medicaid days in this sector 
are less but are not statistically significant. 
Our earlier analysis an bad debts showed that 
nonprofits were similar to forprofits. Let us examine 
this in the light of Medicare and Medicaid. Is there 
reason to believe that the provision of care to Medicare 
and Medicaid patients might be related to bad debts. We 
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regress bad debts on five predictors (nonprofit, 
government, bed size, Medicare, and Medicaid days>. The 
R square is 47.57.. Only government hospitals show a 
statistically significant t-ratio <4.44>. Here, we fail 
to find evidence linking the amount of bad debts to 
Medicare and Medicaid days. However, one might suspect 
that differences in Medicare days and Medicaid days 
affect occupancy rates. We regress occupancy rates on 
five predictors (nonprofit, government, beds, Medicare 
days, and Medicaid days>. T-ratios were revealing at 
1.80, 1.55, -3.85, 4.82, and 3.93 respectively. R 
square was 43.9/.. This finding could help explain the 
lower occupancy rates in the forprofit hospitals. 
Uncompensated Care. The analyses of the percentage 
of uncompensated care provided by nonprofit, government, 
and forprofit hospitals show statistically significant 
differences at less than .01 <Table XXXIV>. It showed 
that the government hospitals provided the highest 
TABLE XXXIV1 UNCOMPENSATED CARE 
OWNERSHIP MEAN MEDIAN F-SCORE s1a. 
NONPROFIT .97 .70 
GOVERNMENT ~-4~ ~.60 
FORPROFIT .17 .oo 
BRAND MEAN 1.18 63.76 <.01 
amount of uncompensated care and forprofit provided the 
least, followed closely by the nonprofits. To 
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determine whether or not the difference between 
nonprofits and for-profits was significant, both 
hospitals were compared. Table XXXV shows the ..-esults. 
TABLE XXXVt UNCOMPENSATED CARE 
ANOVA AND VA M-W 
F-SCORE BIG. SIG. 
NP v• G 21.~:5 <.01 NS <NB•> 
FP v• a 39.29 <.01 (.01 ((.01*) 
NP v• FP 10.~3 <.01 <.01 
The findings are significant. Nonprofit hospitals 
provided significantly more uncompensated care in 
compa..-ison to the forprofit hospitals. However, 
differences between government and nonprofit hospitals 
were not significant. The finding for government 
hospitals is consistent with our expectation that these 
hospitals will show evidence of maximizing services to 
society. The forprofit hospital showed significantly 
less uncompensated care in comparison to both nonprofit 
and government hospitals. This is consistent with our 
expectation that forprofit hospitals are profit-
maximizers and will avoid p..-oviding services for which 
financing is not available. 
Conclusion. The supporting evidence for property 
rights and subsequent behavior among forprofit and 
government hospitals is clear. The Medicare days for 
nonprofit hospitals were more than forprofit hospitals. 
In terms of Medicaid days, the government hospitals had 
the most compared to both nonprofits and forprofits. In 
terms of uncompensated care, the government hospitals, 
again, provided the most. 
Farprofits seek to maximize profits by limiting 
Medicare, Medicaid, and uncompensated Care. To the 
contrary, the government hospitals showed evidence of 
maximizing services. However, the nonprofits' behavior 
patterns are somewhat similar to the forprofits with 
regard to Medicaid. This is not consistent with the 
property rights theory. Our current knowledge of 
nonprofits is that they have a historical mission to 
serve a charitable purpose, to serve the poor, and 
render a proportionate share of health services for free 
or without compensation. In fact these were partly the 
conditions for the financial assistance (for 
construction under the Hill-Burton Act> given to 
nonprofits. An analysis of hospital financial 
characteristics Florida indicates that nonprofit 
hospitals provided a disproportionate amount of charity 
and uncompensated care at 32.5'l. compared to government 
hospitals at 61.8%. Forprofits provided a minute 5.7% 
<HCCB, 1984>. By virtue of the tax-exempt status of the 
nonprofits, the natu~al extension of this would be the 
social purposes which must be served. 
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If nonprofits are exempt from both property and 
income taxesy the expectation is that appropriate 
amounts of needed services are given. In this sample, 
we find that the number of Medicaid days given by 
nonprofits is not significantly different from the 
~orprofits. A thought-provoking question is: do 
nonprofits provide services to Medicaid patients 
commensurate with their tax-exemption benefits? This, 
unfortunately, is not easily answered. Empirical data 
on taxes needed to make valid comparisons are not 
readily available or accessible. However, if we use the 
tax year 1983 as an example~ the total revenues for 
community nonprofit hospitals in Florida was $89,462,795 
and total expenses were $85,637,108 CHCCB, 1984). Their 
income, thus, amounts to $3,825,787. If taxes were 
applied at a rate which invester-owned hospitals pay 
(24.1'l.>, federal taxes for which nonprofits were 
exempted would be close to $lmillion. This does not 
include property tax exemptions. When patterns such as 
the one seen in this study occur, justification for tax-
exemptions becomes difficult. In essence tax exemption 
is taxpayer subsidy of the hospital. Serious inquiry 
needs to be directed towards what is the proper role of 
the nonprofit hospital in addressing the needs of the 
community where they are located. Note that the 
landmark case of Utah v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc. 
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in 1985 underscored the role of local governments in 
evaluating the extent to which expectations are met and 
to respond appropriately. 
By the same token, what are the legal and moral 
obligations o+ the forprofit hospitals? From this 
vantage point, the fact that forprofit hospitals pay 
income taxes could be seen as discharging their duties 
accordingly. Therefore, they do not have to provide 
care to those who are unable to pay. For the individual 
who is sick and in need of care, with nowhere else to 
go, this is hardly reassuring. When hospitals turn away 
sick patients because they do not have insurance, 
serious jeopardy of life can occur. When this happens, 
the dollar value attached to measures of taxes, 
uncompensated care, and so on become irrelevant. 
This conflict can hardly be resolved. Obtaining 
empirical evidence in this regard will not be easy in 
comparing the benefits of tax-paying hospitals as 
opposed to tax-exempt hospitals who serve charitable 
purposes. As demonstrated in this study, it is 
difficult to assume that nonprofits do in fact serve the 
purposes for which they have been intended. The number 
of Medicaid days provided by the nonprofit hosptals in 
this study do not significantly differ from the 
forp~ofit hospital. Their charges per DRG do not 
approximate that of the government hospitals; and the 
139 
amounts they were reimbursed are higher than that given 
to the government hospitals. 
The government hospitals in this study show 
evidence along the lines of discharging their fiduciary 
responsibilities. Their behavior is consistent with 
output maximization, particularly with regards to 
Medicaid patients. The forprofit hospital behavior in 
this study demonstrates consistency with the property 
rights argument that the rights to residual profit for 
this sector means less provision of care to Medicaid 
patients and less uncompensated care. 
The final stage of our analyses deal with quality 
of care. The fallowing pages will present the results 
of the analyses. 
Qu•lity of C•~• 
Hospital ownership status and quality of care have 
been discussed in various studies <Chapters II and III>. 
The property rights theory would predict that nonprofit 
and government hospitals may provide a better quality of 
care than forprofit hospitals. In theory, the quality 
of care in the government and nonprofit hospital is at a 
level that meets budget constraints. The forprofit 
hospitals, as profit maximizers, need to maintain their 
patient patronage. The quality of care in these 
hospitals, hence, would be at a level where profits are 
maximized and expenses minimized. Additionally, all 
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three hospital types are subject to rules and 
regulations affecting the delivery of health care. 
Therefore, we examine for differences among 
nonprofit, government, and forprofit hospitals in this 
regard. 
Death Rates Per DRG [Hypothesis DlJ. The index of 
quality used in this analysis is death rates per DRG. 
Table XXXVI shows twenty DRGs. Note that not in any one 
DRG was there a statistically significant difference. 
Mortality rate is a general measure of quality. 
However, the selection of this sample for this study 
identified hospitals which are accredited by the JCAH. 
Length of stay and manhours per patient day are likewise 
considered as indicators of quality. For this 
study, though, they were used as indices of efficiency. 
In practice, death rates remain a gross outcome measure 
of quality. 
It was pointed out that the rationale for looking 
at death rates on twenty DRGs for the different 
ownership sectors was that organizational behavior may 
vary because of this cost-containment incentive. 
Specifically, that the forprofit sector's profit-
maximizing behavior might be reflected in higher 
mortality rates far this sector. No support for this 
was evident. 
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TABLE XXXVII PERCENT OF DEATHS BY DRG BY OWNERSHIP TYPE 
GRAND CELL MEANS 
DRG MEAN NONPROF GOVT FORPROF F-SCORE SIB. R2 
14 1S.44 13.07 20.13 16.00 1. 99 
1~ .9~ .79 -~~ 1.21 .81 n• .10 
82 17.8~ 17.34 18.22 18.16 .01 
4.09 ~.08 .29 n• .09 
89 9.87 7.67 11.98 11.99 2.64 n• .13 
96 1.21 1.03 1.09 1.09 .14 n• .03 
122 0 0 0 0 0 
127 8.38 7.76 10.83 8.13 1.21 n• .09 
138 1.94 1.84 1.42 2.19 .28 
140 .34 .~4 .42 .14 2.37 ns .13 
148 6.78 4.22 11.84 7.39 ns .17 
174 4.68 4.87 3.60 4.8~ .19 
182 1.09 1.04 1. 28 1. 07 .10 ns .06 
210 2.94 3.36 2.18 2.82 2.61 ns .03 
243 .26 .46 .17 .1~ .~1 ns .04 
294 2.6~ 1.43 ~.18 2.89 2.34 ns .09 
296 6.66 ~.44 9. 11 6. 93 1. 41 
320 2.69 2.88 3.26 2.3~ .2~ n• .13 
336 .6~ .47 .41 .90 .39 ns .02 
468 8.9~ 9.07 18.09 6.04 2. 13 ns .09 
Conclusion. Numerous concerns have been raised 
when DRGs came into effect with regards to the risks 
posed an the care of the patient when limits are imposed 
on length of stay and limitations on amounts of money 
reimbursed to hospitals for care delivered. One of them 
was that hospitals may discharge patients prematurely 
and cause quality of care to decline. Using death rates 
as an outcome indicator, no statistically significant 
difference was found among the three hospital types on 
twenty DRGs. 
The intended outcome of DRGs was to increase 
competition among hospitals for patients and decrease 
length of stay, thereby ultimately controlling costs of 
health care. With the expanding presence of forprofit 
institutions, there is substantial concern regarding the 
pursuit of profits and quality care in the face of 
decreasing reimbursement monies. The findings in this 
study lend some reassurance that there is a minimum 
level of quality addressed by all three hospital 
ownership types. This is with respect to death rates. 
The author, as with other investigators in the field, 
would rather have the ideal way of measuring quality. 
This would be in terms of quality of life after 
discharge from the hospital, case-specific, with 
stratified sampling. 
To date, very little is known about the 
relationships of organizational mission and patient care 
outcomes. This is not surprising. This author is 
fortunate to have seen health care systems in the 
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Philippinesy Australia 9 and in the last thirteen years 
in the United States, specifically in Florida. 
Comparatively, this society has increasingly relied upon 
the judicial system to resolve many o~ its con~licts --
from child custody 9 visitation rights, who should have 
prayer in schools and the like. No different is the 
hospital setting. The increasing malpractice rates and 
withdrawal of the two largest companies from 
underwriting malpractice insurance ~or physicians in 
Florida lend credence to this. Huge malpractice awards 
to patients have been contested by hospitals and 
physicians. The lawyers have successfully blocked 
legislation in capping monetary awards. It would seem 
logical that i~ the care given by a hospital or a 
physician reflects 11 quality, .. malpractice suits will be 
less likely in these hospitals. A recent Florida 
statute required reporting of cases within 72 hours of 
11 Serious adverse events 11 via the hospital Risk 
Management Program. Clearly, all these indicate that 
problems remain regarding quality of care. 
The difficulties associated with studying quality 
of care at the micro level spring from a protectionist 
attitude on the part of hospitals, physicians, and their 
personnel under threat of losing their jobs should they 
11 blow the whistle ... It is unlikely that information 
will be accessible to the point where valid studies can 
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be made. An even greater problem is that the meaning of 
quality, and how a patient, a physician 9 and a lawyer 
perceives it would differ. 
The following chapter will present a summary of the 
findings, its generalizability in the light of the study 
limitations, its utility from a practical and 
theoretical standpoint, and present a modification to 
the original analytical framework to be considered in 
future research. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
Summary 
There were 56 JCAH accredited hospitals offering 
acute care, general services in this study. The 
framework for analysis described the relationships 
to be examined. Several hypotheses regarding hospital 
behavior were proposed. The results were presented, 
discussed, and conclusions drawn. Table XXXVII is 
presented <next page>. For simplicity, the table does 
nat include the analyses for location and length o~ 
stay, charges, reimbursements, and death rates on twenty 
DRG catego~ies. 
There were institutional variables which were 
explored. Bed size was higher in nonprofit hospitals in 
comparison to forprofit hospitals. Population density 
plays a role in the preference for location by the 
forprofit sector. 
As indicators of efficiency, occupancy rates, 
ancillary service expenses, bad debts, manhours per 
patient day, salaries per FTE, length of stay per DRG, 
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charges per DRG, and reimbursements per DRG were used. 
Some empirical support for the property rights theory 
was obtained. On thr•• indicators out of eight 
TABLE XXXVIII SUMMARY TABLE 
VARIABLE 
BEDS 
OCCUPANCY 
ANCILLARY 
BAD DEBTS 
MANHOURS 
SALARIES 
MEDICARE 
MEDICAID 
UNCOMP. CARE 
[ It•lics: 
[ Bold: 
[ ( ) : 
I NP v• FP 1 NP v• a I FP v• a 
.OS 
.OS2 
.OJ 
<.OS 
HS 
NS 
<.01 
<.01 
HS 
NS 
.01. 
<.02 
HS 
NS 
<.OJ 
<.01 
HS 
NB 
HS 
NB 
<.01 
NS 
.01 
<NS> 
<NS> 
<NB) 
<.01 <<.01) 
HS 
NS CNS> 
HS 
NS 
HS 
NS 
(.01. 
<.OS 
<.01 
NS 
<NS> 
CNS) 
<.OS) 
<NS> 
HS 
NS <NS> 
(.05 
<.OS <.O~S> 
<.01 
NS CNB> 
<.OJ 
<.01 <<.01) 
.OJ 
<.01 <<.01) 
HS 
NS <NS> 
.05 
NS CNB> 
<.OJ 
<.01 <<.01) 
<.01 
<.01 <<.01) 
ANOVA analysis controlling for Beds, Loc.J 
Mann-Whitney Tests J 
Mann-Whitney Test excluding 1 government 
hospital outlier with over 900 beds J 
(bad debts, manhours per patient day, and charges per 
DRG>, statistically significant differences were found. 
There were five indicators (occupancy rates, ancillary 
147 
expenses, salaries per FTE, length of stay per DRG, and 
reimbursement per DRG> which showed no support for the 
property rights theory. In some ways, nonprofit 
hospitals mimic their forprofit counterpart <in terms of 
bad debts>. We can only speculate on reasons ~hy we 
failed to find support for the property rights theory on 
five variables (occupancy rates, ancillary expenses, 
salaries per FTE, length of stay per DRG, and 
reimbursement per DRG>. Hospital occupancy rates are 
affected by the health needs within a community. Often 
even if discounted rates are offered, this does not 
produce a corresponding rise in hospital admissions. 
Hospital personnel salaries are broad indicators and do 
not take into account the possibility that bonuses, 
stock options, and other fringe bene+its such as paid 
car allowances, housing, and holiday trips might have 
been provided in certain hospital ownership types. The 
length of stay per DRG and reimbursement per DRG 
analyses show results that reflect the response of 
hospitals to cost containment incentives. If these two 
variables were studied over time, one might observe a 
correlation between changes in length of stay, the 
retrospective reimbursement system, and the prospective 
payment system. 
In the context of equity, Medicare days, Medicaid 
days, and the amount of uncompensated care provided by 
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nonpro~it, government, and forprofit hospitals were 
compared. The study findings were consistent with the 
property rights theory. Di~ferences among the three 
hospitals on these variables were found to be 
significant. The implications of these differences were 
discussed in the earlier chapter. More Medicare days in 
the nonprofit compared to the forprofit hospital 
are consistent with output maximization. Nonprofit and 
forprofit hospitals show no statistically significant 
difference in terms of Medicaid. The nonpro~it hospital 
behavior approximates that of the forprofit behavior in 
this regard -- a finding that leads us to suspect that 
there may be other factors other than restraint from 
rights to residual profits that affect nonprofit 
behavior. These were discussed in Chapter II. 
Forprofits provided significantly fewer Medicaid days 
than the government hospitals. This behavior is 
consistent with the property rights expectation. In 
terms of uncompensated care, the forprofits were 
significally lower and this evidence is also consistent 
with the property rights theory. 
The study revealed evidence on the relationship of 
ancillary service expenses, Medicare days, and Medicaid 
days. Witp hospitals differing significantly on 
Medicare and Medicaid days, it is worth noting that 
these account for 91.3/. of the variation in ancillary 
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services. This means that the changes in the target 
patient population of hospital services according to 
ownership categories <provision of services to Medicare 
and Medicaid recipients versus private payers> would be 
a definite area for future research. The variation on 
bad debts cannot be explained in terms of the variation 
in Medicare and Medicaid days. However, it can be 
explained by the amount of uncompensated care provided 
by the hospital. 
Some interesting questions remain unanswered. Why 
do nonprofits have similar Medicaid days with forprofit. 
Government hospitals provided more in terms of Medicaid. 
Nonprofit hospital bad debts are not significantly 
different than the farprofits. Does this mean that 
nanprofits limit their bad debts by limiting the number 
of Medicaid days? Are services provided in nonprofit 
and forprafit hospitals sufficiently different so that 
they can only admit certain types of patients? These 
interesting anomalies have not been fully investigated 
in this study. Certainly, these are avenues far 
continued investigation. 
In the context of quality of care, the death rates 
for each of the top twenty DRGs common to all hospitals 
in the study were compared. No significant differences 
were found. However, there are other outcome indicators 
of quality which can be used in future evaluations. The 
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difficulty lies in framing the analyses and the 
agreement on the definition of quality of care. A 
greater problem is access to information. This gray 
area remains even though the findings show that 
hospitals, regardless of ownership status, maintain a 
level of quality which does not compromise patient 
lives. 
This study explored questions in the extremely 
complicated context of efficiency, equity, and quality 
of care provided in the nonprofit, government, and 
forprofit hospitals under DRGs. The property right 
arrangements were hypothesized to produce specific 
outcomes in hospital behavior. Government hospitals 
were found to be consistent with the characteristics 
expected with the present property right arrangement. 
Nonprofit hospital behavior shows some evidence of 
output maximization and mimics the forprofit hospital 
in certain ways. This reiterates the need to study the 
performance of this sector. Forprofit hospital behavior 
was consistent with profit maximization. 
To conclude, the results of this study showed 
mixed support for the property rights theory in the 
context of efficiency, equity, and quality of ca~e. The 
behavior of the nonprofit hospitals can not be fully 
l · d d clea~ly rema.l·ns an avenue far future exp a.1ne an • 
researchers. The fallowing discussion will focus on the 
potential utility o~ the study ~indings and suggestions 
far future research. 
Our study sample included hospitals in South 
Florida. There are both disadvantages and advantages. 
The disadvantages include the small sample size which 
limits generalizability. This limited the number of 
hospitals in each ownership category. The study area 
was limited to three counties. Nonetheless, the fifty-
six hospitals in this study consisted of a majority for 
South Florida. A total of eight hospitals are in this 
area. Advantages in using the sample here include the 
following. The author is knowledgeable of the internal 
operations of some hospitals in the area; a complete 
data set for the variables and DRS categories were 
available; and the use of South Florida eliminates area 
variation with regard to population densities, health 
status, and health care practice. In particular, this 
study could be done utilizing a similar model in other 
parts of Florida. It would be interesting to see if the 
findings would support the property rights view. With 
this thought, let us follow this discussion with 
suggestions for future research on property rights and 
hospital behavior. 
Having made the determination that DRG comparisons 
were not particularly revealing, the author recommends 
that future analyses be done on hospital bu~~et data 
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only. This will allow inclusion of all ~he counties 
throughout the state of Flar!da. An analysis for 
several years: 1?857 1986 7 and in a few months 7 1987 
would be pos~ible. With a larger sample, the study will 
allow classification of hospitals by service type using 
the model by Berry (1973>; comparisons of different 
counties throughout the state; and within ownership 
types, subclassification of hospitals as forprofit chain 
or non-chain and sa on. In addition to this, it is 
important to include classification of insurance payers 
1.e. private 1nsurance versus Medicare or Medicaid. 
The use of death rates per DRG is a gross indicator 
of quality. Recent developments regarding the reporting 
of serious incidents is now mandated by Florida statute. 
It should be available from HRS for each hospital in 
Florida. Another alternative 1s to rev1ew the JCAH list 
of recommendations for each hospital, if this was 
obtainable. Having discussed some future research 
considerations, let us point out the utility of the 
study. 
From a practical standpoint, the knowledge we now 
have regarding the behavior of hospitals in South 
Florida may help us identify what incentives produce 
specific outcomes. Local health administrators involved 
in shaping the structure of this community's health care 
system might consider the specific issues relating to 
153 
the provision of care to Medicaid patients. 
Particularly important is the fact that if there are 
community health needs which are nat being addressed, 
it would be wise to consider to what extent the 
forprofit and nonprofit sectors could be utilized to 
meet these needs. 
From a theoretical standpoint, we found some 
evidence in support of the property rights theory. We 
focused on rights to residual profits in the forprofit 
sector and maximizing services to society subject to 
budget constraints in the nonprofit and government 
sector as the fundamental bases for the distinction in 
hospital behavior. The government and forprofit 
hospital behavior appear consistent with the theoretical 
expectations. The nonprofit hospitals, though, behave 
in certain ways like the forprofit hospital. It is 
important to reiterate, here, that nonprofit hospitals 
are not restrained from making profits. It is only the 
restraint on the accrual of profits to its governing 
body that is specifically delineated. In fact, 
voluntary hospital associations have separate 
corporations that handle investments for their nonprofit 
hospital members. We can only speculate what kind of 
ramifications this will have on the internal operations 
of the nonprofit hospital. The evidence in this study 
leads the author to believe that property rights theory 
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can not be used to fully explain why this sector mimics 
the forprofits in certain respects. We might consider a 
modification to our original framework for analysis. 
Let us think of property rights along a continuum. 
Over time, incentives change. The true nonprofit 
hospitals many years ago were run by religious orders 
and cared for those who need their service with little 
or no compensation. As incentives were created to 
encourage production of services to specific groups 
<such as children, pregnant women, elderly, indigents>, 
we will find the inception of nonprofit organizations 
geared towards this. This author proposes that there 
are hospitals which are hybrid nonprofit firms falling 
somewhere along the property rights continuum. These 
hybrid organizations might be organized under the 
leadership of individuals who may have a variety of 
motivations: economic interests, prestige, achievement, 
self-actualization, etc. Some of these leaders may be 
doctors or consumer groups. Depending on haw much 
control over the decision-making process the governing 
body has, the position of this nonprofit organization 
changes along this continuum. To investigate this 
possibility, this author proposes the following measures 
as indicators of efficiency: (1) total and operating 
margins, and <2> non-operating revenue. The operating 
margin will show the excess revenues generated primarily 
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from patient charges before taxes and the total margin 
will show excess revenues generated ~rom all sources 
after taxes. The non-operating revenue will include 
unrestricted income from endo~ment funds, retail 
operation revenue, unrestricted gifts, or gain from the 
sale of hospital properties. The equity measures should 
include the Medicare days, Medicaid days, and private or 
charge based patient days. Active participation of 
hospitals in teaching and research should also be used 
as measures of equity. Quality measures should include 
the number of serious incident reports, malpractice 
suits, and the number of recommendations by the Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals. The 
confounding variables to be considered in this analysis 
should include the following: bed size, types of 
services, hospital location, hospital age, health 
policies, span of control/authority, and type of 
leadership. 
Ideally, true nonprofits and forprofits stand 
completely on opposite sides of the continuum. However, 
because hospitals do nat exist in a vacuum, various 
forces in the environment impact on their operations. 
This means that property rights research remains an 
ongoing process of veri+icatian. 
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